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DECONSTRUCTING THE POLITICS OF BEING YELLOW 
 
By LeeAnn O’Neill* 
I  like to stop by the office of my favorite undergraduate pro-fessor at the George Washington University, a Japanese American professor of Japanese Language and Literature 
with strong opinions on just about everything.  Sometimes we 
talk about the things we could not talk about when he was my 
professor; other times, we simply talk.  This time, we discussed 
why he thought Asian Americans were so politically inactive, 
especially given their seemingly advantageous position in soci-
ety.  Our consensus was that Latinos have found an identity uni-
fying multiple ethnic groups, otherwise known as a pan-ethnic 
identity, that Asian Americans have not.  I originally stopped by 
his office with the intention of soliciting an article on this very 
topic from him.  Instead, he challenged me to write this article 
myself. 
 A couple weeks later, I was drinking coffee with one of my 
more politically savvy friends, a prominent Chinese American K 
Street attorney.  Recalling my conversation with my professor, I 
asked him who some of the prominent Latinos are in politics that 
he could think of off the top of his head.1  He swiftly replied Al-
berto Gonzales, Antonio Villaraigosa, Mel Martinez, Anthony 
Romero, and Bill Richardson.2  Then I asked him the same thing 
about prominent Asian Americans in politics.3  I was stunned to 
hear his answer –“Norman Mineta, that Hawaiian guy…does 
Connie Chung count?”4  It was at that moment I knew this article 
would come to fruition.  
INTRODUCTION 
 The 2000 census reported that at 12.6% of the total popula-
tion, Latinos outnumbered African Americans as the largest mi-
nority group in the United States.  Asian Americans numbered 
only 3.6%.5  In 2003, however, Asian Americans had the highest 
median income of any racial group, including Caucasians, at 
$63,251.6  Conversely, Latinos tied African Americans for the 
lowest median income at $34,272.7  Given Asian Americans’ 
history of disenfranchisement, continued discrimination by main-
stream America, and vast potential economic power, why has 
there been such little political coalition building among Asian 
Americans?  Why have Latinos, with a similar history of disen-
franchisement and discrimination, successfully banded together 
politically to bring many Latino political figures to prominence? 
 Critical race theorists argue that race is a social and legal 
construction, a political device to keep people of color subordi-
nated beneath mainstream America.8  Race refers to a “vast 
group of people loosely bound together by historically contin-
gent, socially significant elements of their […] ancestry.” Race 
should be understood as a unique social phenomenon that con-
nects physical features to the essence of a social group.9  As 
such, mainstream America replaces ethnic identity with broad 
labels such as Latino and Asian American.10  Consequently, so-
called racial groups like Latinos and Asian Americans exist as 
social and political constructs against mainstream America.   
 This essay argues that although mainstream America views 
Asian Americans as a pan-ethnic political unit, in reality, there is 
no viable Asian American political identity today.11  Why could 
Latinos use this construct to create a secondary identity outside 
of their ethnicity and establish a political coalition?  In contrast, 
why did Asian Americans rebuff this racial construct?  This es-
say attempts to illustrate why the politics of being Asian Ameri-
can has failed in comparison to the relatively successful politics 
of being Latino.  Acknowledging the importance of the social 
aspect of pan-ethnic identity, the scope of this essay specifically 
focuses on political manifestations against or in support of racial 
constructions. 
THE FACTORS THAT FUEL PAN-ETHNIC POLITICAL   
IDENTITIY 
 General coalition building requires that a group consist of 
like-minded people whose backgrounds, experiences, or posi-
tions in the social structure make them receptive to the ideas of a 
new political movement.12  Pan-ethnic political group identity, 
however, has two separate sources for coalition-building:  (1) 
physical characteristics which induce mainstream America to 
treat members of separate ethnicities the same, transcending eth-
nicity or nationality and (2) social characteristics such as lan-
guage, education discrimination, and job discrimination.13  
THE ORIGINS OF THE LATINO POLITICAL IDENTITY:    
THE CASE OF CHICAGO AND THE UNLIKELY POLITICAL 
UNION BETWEEN MEXICAN AMERICANS AND        
PUERTO RICANS 
 
“Mexicans see Puerto Ricans as U.S. Citizens who come to this 
country with a lot of privileges and we don’t take advantage of 
those privileges.”14  
– Interview with Puerto Rican in Chicago 
 
“The thing with Mexicans is that they know they are wetbacks.”15 
– Interview with Puerto Rican in Chicago 
 
“Mexicans don’t go on welfare; welfare is for Blacks, Americans, 
and Puerto Ricans, because they’re lazy.”16  
– Interview with Mexican American in Chicago 
 
 Chicago’s Latino population is dominated by two ethnic 
groups: Mexican Americans, who comprise approximately 70% 
of the Latino population, and Puerto Ricans, who make up ap-
proximately 15% of the Latino population.17  Mexican Ameri-
cans and Puerto Ricans in Chicago have a history of intense dis-
crimination and stereotyping against each other; for example, the 
Southside Mexican American stereotype versus the Humboldt 
Park Puerto Rican gangster stereotype.  For Chicago Latinos, a 
Mexican American should never identify or associate with 
 Puerto Ricans or vice versa.18  Even semantics of language, the 
most apparent commonality between the two groups, was a sali-
ent source of division.  Rather than unifying Spanish speakers, it 
became a mechanism for self-stratification based on competing 
notions of proper upbringing and civility.19   
 Contrary to such tensions and isolation, the development 
and success of a Latino coalition reflects the unified response of 
Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans to common discrimina-
tion by mainstream America.  The affirmative action policy that 
emerged out of the 1964 and 1968 Civil Rights Acts laid the 
foundation for the formation of a pan-
ethnic Latino political coalition.20  
Chicago corporations’ blanket job 
discrimination against Mexican 
Americans and Puerto Ricans gave 
birth to the Spanish Coalition for Jobs 
in the 1970s, which strove to enforce 
the affirmative action statutes.21   “At 
the center of Latino ethnic affinity and 
mobilization were the structural and 
circumstantial conditions of working-
class solidarity” and collective oppres-
sion.22  Under these conditions, the 
political coalition in Chicago between 
Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans grew to encompass 
broader issues based on their common socio-economic status 
within the Black-White paradigm, including bilingual education 
and work-sponsored “English as a Second Language” classes.  
 Chicago illustrates the political reaction of Mexican Ameri-
cans and Puerto Ricans to mainstream American discrimination 
against Latinos as a racial group.  Mexican Americans and 
Puerto Ricans found common ground in the “political ethnicity” 
of being Latino, “a manipulative device for the pursuit of collec-
tive political, economic, and social interests in society.”23  Job 
discrimination manifested itself as discrimination against Span-
ish speakers as a racial group for the corporations in Chicago.  
The common thread of speaking Spanish was not the basis of the 
coalition, but rather a tool for strengthening their group con-
sciousness.24  Thus, Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans in 
Chicago remained Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans first, 
but together, they identified as Latino. 
THE LATINO POLITICAL IDENTITY TODAY:                 
THE CASE OF LOS ANGELES AND THE ELECTION OF 
ANTONIO VILLARAIGOSA 
 Los Angeles is home to one of the most diverse populations 
in the United States, with a population of 48% Latino, 31% Cau-
casian, 11% Asian American, and 10% African American.25  On 
May 17, 2005, Mexican American Antonio Villaraigosa beat 
incumbent mayor James Hahn as the first Latino mayor of Los 
Angeles in over a century.  Villaraigosa found broad support 
across all key demographics: racial, ethnic, economic, and geo-
graphic groups.  Time Magazine hailed his election as a symbol 
of “a bridge-building, post-ethnic style of politics.”26  Post-
election news coverage, however, glossed over the importance 
of the fact that an overwhelming 84% of registered Latinos 
voted for Villaraigosa.  The 2000 Census indicated that while 
about a million Mexican Americans reside in Los Angeles, well 
over half a million Latinos are from other countries of origin, 
making Mexican Americans 63% of Los Angeles’ Latino popu-
lation.27  For the non-Mexican American Latinos in Los Ange-
les, Villaraigosa may have been just a Latino mayoral candidate; 
even though in the broad context of the election he was more 
than just that. 
       In Villaraigosa’s failed 2001 bid 
for mayor, he garnered nearly the 
same percentage of the Latino vote as 
the 2005 election.  Furthermore, in 
2005, he generated a record voter turn-
out among Latinos in Los Angeles.28  
Pre-election data reflects that a domi-
nating 82.4% of registered Latino vot-
ers in Los Angeles indicated that they 
would participate in the runoff elec-
tion.29  Approximately 41% of regis-
tered Latino voters in the United 
States indicated that they are more 
likely to vote if there is a Latino on the 
ballot.30  Nearly a quarter of these voters would pick a Latino 
candidate even when a more qualified non-Latino candidate 
appears on the ballot.31  In other words, a vast majority will vote 
for a Latino candidate if running against an equally qualified 
non-Latino candidate.32  Consequently, the perception of Vil-
laraigosa as a Latino candidate in the eyes of Latinos played a 
large role in the participation and voting patterns of Latinos in 
Los Angeles. 
 Just as job discrimination became a uniting force in Chi-
cago, the primaries indicated that Latino voters favor candidates 
who talk about their issues and reach out to them.33  Although 
some Latino voters admitted to voting for Villaraigosa because 
he was “one of their own,” his platform spoke to the top three 
issues for Latinos - education, health care, and labor.34  Rather 
than focusing on his Mexican American heritage, which he 
wears proudly, he identified with his constituents as someone 
who grew out of poverty and championed the collective socio-
economic interests held by Latinos in Los Angeles.35  Instead of 
using language as a basis of unity, he used it as a political tool.  
He appealed to the Latino vote with appearances on Univision 
and adopted Cesar Chavez’s mantra “Si, se puede,” which 
means, “It can be done,” as his campaign slogan.36   
 Villaraigosa’s victory illustrates the growth of the Latino 
political entity from a citywide campaign to a nationwide phe-
nomenon.  Mainstream America fears the sleeping voting super-
power of Latinos and Villaraigosa’s victory has heightened that 
fear.37  Latinos across the nation see Villaraigosa’s victory as 
one for Latinos, not just for Mexican Americans.  His victory 
symbolizes the new Latino political power in the Democratic 
Party.38  The Latino political movement has turned him into a 
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 tool of the movement, motivating and facilitating the advance-
ment of other Latinos.  Consequently, Villaraigosa has paved the 
way for future political candidates labeled as Latinos to draw on 
his success.  
THE ORIGINS OF ASIAN AMERICAN POLITICAL          
DISUNITY: THE CASE OF VINCENT CHIN 
 In 1982, two Caucasian males murdered Chinese American 
Vincent Chin in Detroit because he looked Japanese.  At a time 
when Japan was a looming economic superpower, the two men 
sympathized with Congressman John Dingell’s angry speech in 
Congress blaming “little yellow men” for the demise of Ameri-
can automakers and blamed Chin, as a 
yellow man, for the loss of American 
car manufacturing jobs.39  The Chi-
nese American community was not 
only shocked by the nature of the hate 
crime, but by the fact that the murder-
ers only received a sentence of proba-
tion.  The nation had yet to recognize 
the concept of a hate crime.40   
 Chinese American organizations 
developed the first pan-Asian political 
entity, the American Citizens for Jus-
tice (“ACJ”), with some support from Japanese American, Ko-
rean American, and Filipino American organizations.  The ACJ 
became the first explicitly Asian American civil rights advocacy 
effort with a national scope.41  This was an ambitious attempt 
given Asian Americans’ tendency to disassociate themselves 
from harassed Asian American groups.   
 Historically, Asian Americans have only attempted to es-
chew the generic yellow label.  For example, during the World 
War II internment of the Japanese Americans, Chinese Ameri-
cans hung signs saying “This is a Chinese shop” and Korean 
Americans hung signs claiming that “We Hate Japs Worse Than 
You Do.”42  This antagonism reflected recent Chinese American 
and Korean American immigrants’ backlash against the imperi-
alist policies of Japan against China and Korea back home.  
More recently, in the aftermath of the 1992 riots and ravaging of 
Koreatown in Los Angeles, there was a striking absence of other 
Asian Americans during the peace march to demand the rebuild-
ing of Koreatown.43  A Chinese American editor for the Los 
Angeles Times voiced what no one else wanted to admit out loud 
– she did not march because she was afraid of being mistaken 
for Korean.44 
 The ACJ had only limited success and the movement in 
Detroit waned.  The Chin saga ended with the return of Chin’s 
mother to China in 1987, disgusted with the United States legal 
system for acquitting both murderers of all charges.45  The ACJ 
was only successful because the Chin murder shed light on a 
horrible truth; Asian Americans did not have a choice in mis-
taken identity.  In the eyes of mainstream America, if the alleged 
enemy is Korean, then all yellow people are Korean.  If the al-
leged enemy is Japanese, then all yellow people are Japanese.  If 
Chin had been Japanese and murdered because he was Japanese, 
would Asian Americans have come together to fight the injus-
tice of giving probation for murder?  It is troubling that the po-
litical coalition of Asian Americans has weakened without an 
imminent civil rights threat based on mistaken identity. 
 Unlike the Latinos in Chicago, Asian Americans in Detroit 
found very little common political ground beyond the color of 
their skin and the shape of their eyes to propel the movement 
forward.46  The Immigration Act of 1965 ushered in a new gen-
eration of Asian Americans, including Chinese, Korean, Fili-
pino, and South Asian immigrants in Detroit.  The new regula-
tions heavily favored educated professionals and a new Asian 
American middle class composed of 
the children of the laundry and restau-
rant owners who had completed col-
lege by the 1980s.47   
         This upward movement in soci-
ety removed common factors like pov-
erty and socio-economic status as 
goals for political unity and conse-
quently, removed factors that would 
help keep the ACJ a viable organiza-
tion.  Unlike Latinos, who as a group 
suffer from a growing occupational 
divide with respect to mainstream America, Asian Americans 
have surpassed the success of mainstream America as a group.48  
Furthermore, Asian Americans in Detroit lacked certain tools of 
coalition such as the Latinos’ power as the largest minority and 
their common language.  Asian Americans were vastly outnum-
bered, comprising less than 1.5% of metropolitan Detroit’s 
population.49   
 It is worth noting that South Asian Americans were the 
largest Asian American group in Detroit.50  Although South 
Asian Americans supported the ACJ, they comprised a very 
small part of the organization.  For example, South Asian 
Americans were not identified as participating in street demon-
strations, which consisted mostly of Chinese Americans, with 
some support from Korean Americans, Japanese Americans, and 
Filipino Americans.51  Why?  Possibly because South Asian 
Americans, with their own distinct physical characteristics, were 
less likely to be mistaken for Japanese.  The trend towards the 
social construct of Asian Pacific American as a distinct group 
from South Asian American is logical given the purpose for 
which Asian Americans created the ACJ.   
THE ASIAN AMERICAN IDENTITY TODAY:                  
THE CASE OF OREGON AND THE ELECTION OF       
DAVID WU 
 The United States Senate has two Asian American Senators.  
Both, unsurprisingly, are from Hawaii, the only state where 
Asian Americans make up the highest proportion of the total 
population.52  There are only five Asian Americans in the United 
States House of Representatives.53  In 1998, David Wu became 
the first Taiwan-born American elected to Congress.  He was 
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 sworn into his fourth term on January 4, 2005 as the Representa-
tive for Oregon.  Oregon is only 2% Asian American.54   
 Like other Asian American political candidates, Wu 
avoided playing the race card and ran on a platform appealing to 
Oregon voters of all backgrounds, including education, health-
care, and social security.55  In fact, it is likely he alienated Chi-
nese American supporters in the 2000 election when he voted 
against Permanent Normal Trade Relations with China.  Many 
Chinese Americans voted for him in 1998 simply because he 
was Chinese American and crossed party lines to do so.56  When 
it became clear Wu was not a candidate for Chinese Americans, 
they crossed back over the party lines during his re-election.  
His campaign website mentions his ethnicity in one small para-
graph at the end of his biography.57  A family photo with his 
blonde, Caucasian wife is juxtaposed against this paragraph, as 
if to offset the fact he is Taiwanese American. 
 Even more revealing is the lack of a reaction to the 1998 
election.  Asian Americans have not turned the election of David 
Wu into a symbol of the emergence of Asian Americans in poli-
tics.  The media coverage did not hail it as a new day for Asian 
Americans.  Chinese American voters felt that regardless of 
Wu’s election, Asian Americans still lacked political clout and 
that “whatever we thought, it probably didn’t make that much of 
a difference.”58  Unlike Villaraigosa, who followed “the rule of 
thumb for race politics” by mobilizing “his people” and swing-
ing enough votes among “other people,” Wu was elected with 
“no people” by swinging all of Portland.59   
 David Wu’s election demonstrates that “Asian Americans 
are united more by the label that others put on them than by lan-
guage, religion or ethnic or national ties.”60  Unlike the Latino 
political movement, language does not exist as a tool for coali-
tion.  Although Asian Americans experience discrimination, it 
does not have as great an impact on their socio-economic status.  
For example, the U.S. Census Bureau estimates that 50% of 
Asian Americans over age twenty-five have at least a bachelor’s 
degree in comparison to the overall average of 27%.61  Stereo-
types of Asian Americans as the model minority are not as de-
bilitating as the stereotypes for Latinos.  Race politics are in-
creasingly becoming a moot point due to the relatively minute 
size of the Asian American population and its economic and 
social diversity.62  As Asian American communities become 
more diverse, they become increasingly divided on political is-
sues.  An especially significant rift has arisen between the 
“liberal Asian American establishment” and the relatively new 
Asian American neo-conservative movement.63  Additionally, 
“[m]any new Asian immigrants […] are coming to the United 
States with no sense of Asian American solidarity and little un-
derstanding of the Asian American history of oppression.”64   
CONCLUSION 
 Asian Americans have learned that the key to political suc-
cess is not in race politics or the promotion of a pan-ethnic po-
litical identity, but rather to divorce themselves from their 
Asian-ness and focus on broader appeal.  Even in areas domi-
nated by Asian Americans such as South Pasadena, they have 
never played race as a political card.  As an Asian American city 
councilor in South Pasadena said, “I never campaign as an 
Asian.  I campaign as a concerned citizen.”65  As the United 
States becomes more diverse, lingering reasons for an Asian 
American political coalition will become outdated.  Asian 
Americans will quietly continue their growth on the political 
scene, generating issue-based, but not race-based appeal.  The 
continued diversification of the Asian American community 
signals the death knell of any lingering Asian American political 
unity.  Unless Asian Americans can find a new common ground, 
the answer will likely remain, “Does Connie Chung count?” 
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 LEAVE THOSE KIDS ALONE: 
WHY THE FIRST AMENDMENT DOES NOT PROTECT THE BOY 
SCOUTS OF AMERICA IN ITS DISCRIMINATION AGAINST  
GAY YOUTH MEMBERS 
 
By Sean Griffith, J.D.* 
O n June 9, 2003, the Boy Scouts of America’s (“BSA”) Cradle of Liberty Council released a position statement on its leadership standards stating, “[a]pplications for 
leadership and membership do not inquire into sexual orienta-
tion.  However, an individual who declares himself to be a ho-
mosexual would not be permitted to join Scouting.  All members 
in Scouting must affirm the values of the Scout Oath and Law, 
and all leaders must be able to model those values for youth.”1  
Additionally, the position statement reaffirms that “the Boy 
Scout promises to do his duty to God and to be morally straight, 
as well as to be clean in his thoughts, words and deeds.”2  These 
position statements are a clear indicator that the BSA intends to 
extend its ban on gay leaders to its youth members.3 
The Supreme Court’s existing framework for deciding when 
a state’s interest in preventing discrimination conflicts with a 
private group’s right to associate leaves open a grey area with 
regard to the denial of youths’ membership to the BSA.  The 
BSA’s ban on openly gay youth members likely goes beyond the 
scope of the Supreme Court’s decision in Boy Scouts of America 
v. Dale, which found that a state could not compel the BSA to 
retain an avowed homosexual as an assistant scoutmaster.4   
This article will argue that Boy Scouts of America v. Dale 
should extend only to persons in adult leadership positions 
within the BSA and that its current ban on openly gay youth 
members constitutes unacceptable discrimination.  This article 
asserts that states have a compelling interest in preventing the 
discrimination of youth members based on sexual orientation 
that outweighs the BSA’s First Amendment right of expressive 
association.  Finally, a state may have a further compelling inter-
est in protecting youth members of the Boy Scouts from dis-
crimination because of the unique role the group plays in chil-
dren’s education. 
THE SUPREME COURT: WHEN GROUP FREEDOMS    
CONFLICT WITH THE STATE’S INTEREST 
The Supreme Court held that freedom of association is a 
fundamental right that, while not explicitly stated in the Consti-
tution, is protected by the First Amendment.  In protecting this 
right the Supreme Court recognizes two distinct incarnations of 
the freedom to associate.  First, individuals have a freedom of 
intimate association which protects close relationships from gov-
ernment imposition by acting as a “critical buffer between the 
individual and the power of the state.”5  Second, the Supreme 
Court recognized that citizens must have freedom of expressive 
association, which protects First Amendment rights against gov-
ernment intrusion by allowing individuals to unite with others 
holding common views for an expressive purpose.6  This article 
is concerned with the freedom of expressive association. 
Implicit in the freedom to associate is the freedom not to 
associate, which is to say, the freedom to discriminate.7  Con-
versely, the Supreme Court has recognized that a state may have 
a compelling interest in protecting certain classes of people from 
discrimination.8  States have passed public accommodation stat-
utes which prohibit private groups from denying an individual 
access to a public accommodation because of his or her race, sex, 
orientation, or other characteristics.  In Roberts, the Supreme 
Court emphasized that public accommodations laws “plainly 
serve[d] compelling state interests of the highest order,”9 and 
recognized that a state's compelling interest in mandating equal 
access to women extends to the acquisition of leadership skills 
and business contacts.10  Therefore, because the Supreme Court 
recognizes both a group’s freedom to discriminate and a state’s 
interest in preventing discrimination, the stage is set for conflict.  
In Roberts, Duarte, and New York Club Ass’n, the Supreme 
Court laid the framework for considering how conflicts between 
state interests and group rights should be decided.11  First, the 
Supreme Court considered whether the state’s interest was com-
pelling.  All three cases recognized that states have a compelling 
interest in eliminating public accommodations’ policies which 
discriminated against women.12  Second, the Supreme Court 
asked whether the group in question was an expressive associa-
tion.  In Roberts13 and Duarte,14 the Court found that individuals 
had united to engage in purposeful, protected speech and thus, 
the freedom to associate was implicated.15  Third, the Supreme 
Court asked whether inclusion of the excluded group would bur-
den the group’s messages.  Although no burden was found in 
these cases, the Supreme Court recognized that inclusion of an 
unwanted group could impair the expressive capacity of the asso-
ciation enough to trigger First Amendment protection.16   
In these three cases, the Supreme Court never had to balance 
a state’s interest in preventing discrimination against a private 
group’s First Amendment freedoms because in all three cases, 
the Supreme Court found no burden on First Amendment activ-
ity.17  However, two points are vital to this article.  First, Roberts 
held that the amount of protection the First Amendment offers 
may be conditional.  “The nature and degree of constitutional 
protection afforded freedom of association may vary depending 
on the extent to which one or the other aspect of the constitution-
ally protected liberty is at stake.”18  Second, even where a court 
recognizes that inclusion of an unwanted group will burden an 
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 association’s ability to express its message, “[t]he right to asso-
ciate for expressive purposes is not, however absolute.  Infringe-
ments on that right may be justified by regulations adopted to 
serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of 
ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less 
restrictive of association freedoms.”19 
DALE: WHEN THE STATE CANNOT FORCE A        
GROUP TO ADMIT A LEADER WHO WOULD              
COMPROMISE EXPRESSION 
James Dale began scouting as an eight year old and attained 
the rank of Eagle Scout at the age of eighteen.  The following 
year he applied for adult membership, and BSA approved him 
for the position of assistant scoutmaster.  During this time Dale 
became the co-president of the Rutgers University Lesbian/Gay 
Alliance and was interviewed by a newspaper regarding his ad-
vocacy for the psychological needs of homosexual teenagers.  
Soon after, Dale received a letter from a BSA executive asking 
him to revoke his adult membership.20  Dale was denied his right 
to attend a hearing to review his case because BSA, “does not 
admit avowed homosexuals to membership in the organiza-
tion.”21   
Consequently, Dale filed a complaint against the BSA, al-
leging that it violated New Jersey’s public accommodations stat-
ute, Law Against Discrimination (“LAD”), by revoking his ad-
mittance because of his sexual orientation.22  The BSA success-
fully appealed the case to the Supreme Court, which held that 
applying New Jersey’s public accommodations law to the BSA 
violated its First Amendment right of expressive association.23   
The Supreme Court first considered whether BSA was an 
expressive group, and if so, whether an anti-homosexual mes-
sage was part of its expression, noting that the purpose of BSA 
is to instill values in youths, “by having its adult leaders spend 
time with the youth members, instructing and engaging them” in 
various activities.24  “The scoutmasters and assistant scoutmas-
ters inculcate them with the Boy Scouts’ values – both expressly 
and by example.”25  Thus, the Supreme Court held that BSA is 
an expressive group, with its expression being anti-
homosexuality.26  The Supreme Court held that the judiciary 
may not “reject a group’s expressed values because they dis-
agree with those values or find them internally inconsistent.”27   
If BSA claims to be anti-homosexual, the Court holds, it “cannot 
doubt that the Boy Scouts sincerely holds this view.”28   
Next, the Supreme Court asked, “whether Dale’s presence 
as an assistant scoutmaster would significantly burden the Boy 
Scouts’ desire to not promote homosexual conduct as a legiti-
mate form of behavior.”29  The Court declared, “as we give def-
erence to an association’s assertions regarding the nature of its 
expression, we must also give deference to an association’s view 
of what would impair its expression.”30  The Court emphasized 
that Dale was a gay activist and his presence as a leader would 
“at the very least, force the organization to send a message, both 
to the youth members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts 
homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.”31 
The Supreme Court then analogized this case to Hurley v. 
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston.  In 
Hurley, the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled that the Gay, 
Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston (GLIB) was entitled to 
march because it was impossible to detect an expressive purpose 
in the parade, there was no state action, and the parade was a 
public accommodation.”32  The South Boston Allied War Veter-
ans Council (“Council”) did not wish to exclude GLIB because 
of the orientation of its members, but because it did not want to 
march behind a GLIB banner.  However, the Supreme Court 
reversed the Massachusetts Court’s decision finding there was 
no violation of Massachusetts’ public accommodation law by 
the Council in excluding the GLIB from the parade.  The Su-
preme court consistently ruled that GLIB’s presence behind a 
banner would have “interfered with the parade organizers’ 
choice not to propound a particular point of view, the presence 
of Dale as an assistant scoutmaster would just as surely interfere 
with the Boy Scouts’ choice not to propound a point of view 
contrary to its beliefs.”33  Therefore, the Supreme Court ruled 
that requiring BSA to, “retain Dale as an assistant scoutmaster 
would significantly burden the organization’s right to oppose or 
disfavor homosexual conduct.”34 
Finally, the Court considered whether the New Jersey pub-
lic accommodations law requiring that the Boy Scouts accept 
Dale as an assistant scoutmaster interferes with the Scouts’ free-
dom of expressive association.35  Without ruling directly on 
whether BSA was a public accommodation or whether New 
Jersey had a compelling interest, the Court distinguished Dale 
from Duarte, Roberts, and New York State Club Assn.  While 
the Court found a compelling state interest in each of these 
cases, there were no “significant burdens” to expressive associa-
tion and as such, the Supreme Court did not have to balance 
state interests against group rights in any of those cases.36  In 
Dale, however, the Supreme Court had to conduct a balancing 
test because of its finding of a “significant burden” and held that 
the “state interests embodied in New Jersey’s public accommo-
dations law do not justify such a severe intrusion on the Boy 
Scouts’ rights to freedom of expressive association.”37     
LEAVE THOSE KIDS ALONE 
Given the BSA’s vocal opposition to gay members as well 
as adult leaders in their position statement of 2003, it is likely 
that they will attempt to bar openly gay youth in the same man-
ner as the ejection of Dale from the BSA.  In doing so, the BSA 
will likely attempt to invoke Dale as extending to openly gay 
youth. 
WHY THE BSA CANNOT DIRECTLY EXTEND DALE TO 
YOUTH MEMBERS 
There are two main reasons why the Supreme Court should 
read Dale as restricted to adult leadership positions, and not 
youth members.  First, the language of every Dale holding spe-
cifically pertains to adult leadership positions.  Second, Dale’s 
critical analogy to Hurley would prove unworkable if it was 
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 meant to apply to youth membership.  Additionally, lower courts 
have reached no consensus on a reading of Dale.38 
In Dale, the Supreme Court determined that BSA was an 
expressive association and that an anti-homosexual message was 
part of their First Amendment protected speech.39  However, in 
the Supreme Court’s examples of how this message was ex-
pressed, it only cited the expressions of adult leadership.  BSA 
wrote that its mission was  
“to instill values in young people… by having its 
adult leaders spend time with the youth members…  
During this time spent with the youth members, the 
scoutmasters and assistant scoutmasters inculcate 
them with the Boy Scout’s values – both expressly 
and by example.”40   
In every example the Supreme Court offered, the speaker was 
the adult scout leader and the audience was the youth member.  
The Supreme Court did not address the expressive message of 
the individual boy scouts who were “inculcated.”  
Having established that BSA is an expressive group with an 
anti-homosexual message, the Supreme Court then considered 
“whether Dale’s presence as an assistant scoutmaster would 
significantly burden the Boy Scouts’ desire to not ‘promote ho-
mosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.’”41  The 
Supreme Court found in the affirmative, finding that allowing 
Dale to continue as a leader would, “force the organization to 
send a message, both to the youth members and the world, that 
the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form 
of behavior.”42   The Supreme Court did not rule on whether it 
was Dale’s identity as a gay activist, a gay scout leader, or 
merely self-identification as being gay which would burden the 
BSA’s message.  The Supreme Court only asked whether Dale, 
who was a vocal gay advocate, would burden the Scouts mes-
sage.   
Based on the preceding findings, it seems likely the Su-
preme Court intended a narrow holding.  The language of Dale 
is confined to answering a question about James Dale and possi-
bly adult leadership positions in general, but it never represents 
youth members as speakers.  As such, the holding should be 
limited to vocal gay advocates in positions of adult leadership.  
Rather, the youth members are the intended audience of BSA’s 
speech and message and the Supreme Court does not identify 
any expressive role for them.   
Furthermore, the Dale Court relies greatly on Hurley.  
While the Council stated their reasoning for not admitting the 
GLIB into the parade was because they did not want to march 
behind a banner,43 the Council would not have had power to 
deny admittance to individual homosexuals who wished to 
march.44  If the Dale decision were meant to extend to youth 
members without any contention that youth members expressed 
the BSA’s message, then the Court would be allowing BSA to 
discriminate based only on sexual orientation, which was explic-
itly prohibited in Hurley.45  The analogy between Hurley and 
Dale only works if Dale is read not to implicate youth members. 
 
WHY THE FIRST AMENDMENT BALANCING TEST        
FAVORS GAY YOUTH MEMBERS OF THE BSA 
It is important to note the significance of the absence of a 
Supreme Court ruling on whether BSA should be considered a 
public accommodation in Dale.  One of the pre-requisites of a 
violation of the First Amendment right to expressive association 
is state action.  As noted earlier, state public accommodation 
laws circumvent the requirement of state action to apply to pri-
vate groups.46  Because the Supreme Court in Dale declined to 
rule directly on the issue of public accommodation, going di-
rectly to the First Amendment balancing test, it set the precedent 
that a case regarding exclusion of the BSA’s gay youth members 
should be governed by the balancing test. 
Consequently, the Supreme Court would need to conduct a 
balancing test and find that the state’s interests in preventing 
discrimination against children would outweigh the group’s in-
terest in expressive association.  Two factors would weigh in 
favor of the state’s interest in preventing discrimination: inclu-
sion of a gay youth member would be less of a burden than in-
clusion of a gay scout leader;47 and, the state has a recognized 
compelling interest in protecting youths from BSA’s discrimina-
tion because of the unique role it plays in children’s education.48    
The Supreme Court was clear that James Dale was an ex-
pressive agent of the BSA and, like a group holding a banner in 
Hurley, he contributed to the overall message of the organiza-
tion.  While gay adult scout leaders may be denied participation 
in the BSA because they are expressive agents analogous to sign 
holders in Hurley, a youth member is more analogous to the gay 
individual who wishes to march in the parade without a sign.  
Hurley is clear, moreover, that the First Amendment does not 
protect an expressive association’s decision to deny the mere 
presence of an individual based only on his or her orientation.49  
Thus, a person’s presence alone is not expressive.  Just as indi-
vidual gay marchers could not have burdened the Council’s ex-
pression enough to outweigh the commonwealth’s interest in 
preventing discrimination, a BSA youth member’s presence 
alone cannot burden expression enough to outweigh a state’s 
interest in preventing discrimination. 
A state may also have a compelling interest in protecting 
youths from BSA’s discrimination because of the unique role 
the group plays in children’s education.  This compelling inter-
est may outweigh BSA’s freedom of expressive association.  In 
Boy Scouts of America v. Wyman, Judge Calabresi writing for a 
unanimous court upholding the state interest in Connecticut’s 
Gay Rights Law over the BSA’s right to associative expression, 
personally noted that,  
“[i]t is possible that, under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, a state that has adopted a policy of equal pro-
tection with respect to a specific group may have a 
compelling interest in the enforcement of that pol-
icy, even if the federal government has not recog-
nized that same group’s claim to heightened scrutiny 
for the purposes of equal protection…”50   
Merely because the state interest in Dale could not outweigh 
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BSA’s right to expressive association does not mean that other 
states with less restrictive expressive association rights do not 
have a compelling enough state interest to justify the restric-
tions.51 
Not only have courts recognized that states may have a 
compelling interest in eliminating discrimination, but they have 
also acknowledged states’ “compelling interest in educating its 
youth, to prepare them to participate effectively and intelligently 
in our open political system, and to be self-reliant and self-
sufficient participants in society.”52  The Boy Scouts prepare 
children to be all of these things during a time when, as the BSA 
proclaims on its web site, nearly one in five children in the 
United States lives in poverty.53   
In programs like “Scoutreach,” the BSA “targets youth in 
distressed areas of [the U.S.], where they have many chances to 
fail, and few opportunities to succeed, much less to excel.”  The 
BSA tries to help the many children in the United States who 
struggle with the issues of “[s]ingle parent families, often 
headed by mothers and grandmothers, unemployment, a pattern 
of alcohol and drug abuse and family income below the poverty 
line.”54  Representative Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA) explains that 
the Boy Scouts is, “America's number one values program for 
youth.  Scouting helps strengthen character, develops good citi-
zenship, and enhances both mental and physical fitness among 
its participants. Scouting has helped countless youths from bro-
ken families by providing them with the moral discipline and 
leadership they would have otherwise lacked.”55  
CONCLUSION 
When it comes to the state’s interest in preventing discrimi-
nation, children are easily distinguishable from grown men.  
James Dale was a grown man.  The educational needs, identity 
formation, and self-esteem of an adult is not comparable to a 
child, who is just developing a sense of self and habits for suc-
cess.  The balancing test the Supreme Court should engage in is 
not simply between the interests of a private group and the state, 
but between the irrefutable needs of children and a group’s inter-
est in an untrammeled message.  Each year, the Boy Scouts pro-
vide stability, discipline, and community to hundreds of thou-
sands of youths, helping them become successful adults.   
If a case based on the BSA’s exclusion of gay youth is 
raised, the Supreme Court should address the interests of the 
children.  Furthermore, the Supreme Court should find not only 
that Dale does not extend to the non-leadership positions in the 
BSA, but also that a state has a compelling interest in the rearing 
of its children that outweighs whatever burden a gay youth 
member could place on the message of the nation-wide Boy 
Scouts of America.    
 CRITICIZING CRITICISM OF CRITICISM:   
A LESSON IN OBJECTIVITY FROM REVIEWING  
“IS THE RADICAL CRITIQUE OF MERIT ANTI-SEMETIC?” 
 
By David Dae Hoon Kim, J.D.* 
E ight years ago, professors Daniel A. Farber and Suz-anna Sherry compiled a collection of articles into a book entitled, Beyond All Reason.1  Although they self-
identify as Jewish liberals, Farber and Sherry argue that certain 
liberals, who they call “radical constructivists,”2 undermine the 
“aspiration to universalism and objectivity that is the fruit of the 
European Enlightenment.”3  By writing this book they sought to 
reclaim reason in the law.  
“Is the Radical Critique of Merit Anti-Semitic?,”4 adapted as 
a chapter in Beyond All Reason, was originally a law review 
article published in the California Law Review. The article chal-
lenges critical legal theories for adopting the radical critique of 
merit, merit being measures of group success and achievement.  
The article argues that if existing standards of merit are not valid, 
history has taught that the available explanations for Asian 
American and Jewish success must be anti-Asian and anti-
Semitic.   
Farber and Sherry argue that because radical constructivists 
could not possibly wish to endorse anti-Asianism and anti-
Semitism, radical constructivism is internally inconsistent and 
thus, the wrong approach for critiquing merit.  Farber and Sherry 
propose an alternative approach to radical constructivism: prag-
matism.  Pragmatism accommodates societal and legal change, 
but defers more to tradition and, according to the authors, does 
not have anti-Asian and anti-Semitic consequences.  However, 
while Farber and Sherry aspire to objectivity, they fail to adhere 
to objective principles in making their argument for pragmatism, 
ultimately leading to the same result they fear under radical con-
structivism and unwittingly applying another strain of it. 
RADICAL CONSTRUCTIVISM AND PRAGMATISM          
CONTRASTED 
Farber and Sherry define the “meritocratic ideal” as the be-
lief that “positions in society should be based on the abilities and 
achievements of the individual rather than on characteristics such 
as family background, race, religion, or wealth.”5  Furthermore, 
“[i]n a society that uses merit as a standard for professional suc-
cess, everyone should have an equal right to compete for desir-
able occupations.”6  But according to Farber and Sherry, the radi-
cal constructivist position on merit views “fundamental concepts 
as socially constructed aspects of systems of power.”7  Specifi-
cally, “standards of merit are socially constructed to maintain the 
power of dominant groups,”8 and thus, “‘merit’ has no meaning, 
except as a way for those in power to perpetuate the existing 
hierarchy.”9         
Farber and Sherry find this reasoning politically convenient 
because it allows radical constructivists to avoid investigating 
the underlying reasons for inequality by focusing on effects.  
That is, arguing that “the unequal success rates are per se proof 
of unjust treatment . . . and sufficient justification for remedial 
action.”10  
To set up the consequences of radical constructivism, Farber 
and Sherry first assert that “[b]y almost every measure of suc-
cess, [Jews and native-born Asian Americans] succeed at far 
higher rates than white gentile Americans.”11  Farber and Sherry 
argue that radical constructivism undermines these successes, 
leading to invariably negative stigmas for these groups.  To sup-
port their argument, Farber and Sherry provide four historical, 
prejudicial explanations for the successes of Jews and Asian 
Americans in America as alternatives to those based on accept-
ing existing standards of merit.  
The first explanation purports Asians and Jews succeed as a 
consequence of a “powerful and pervasive” Asian and Jewish 
conspiracy (“conspiracy” theory).12 The second explanation 
characterizes Asians and Jews as “chameleons who, with no cul-
ture of their own, take on the cultural coloration of the society 
around them” (“cultural imitation” theory).13   A third account 
charges Asians and Jews with infiltrating American culture 
(“cultural infiltration” theory).  According to this account, “Jews 
succeed because American culture has taken on Jewish charac-
teristics . . . [i]f American culture is really Jewish culture, then 
Jews are the cause of these deficiencies in our culture and are 
themselves deficient and unappealing.”14  The final explanation 
finds Asian and Jewish success is nothing more than a statistical 
anomaly (“statistical anomaly” theory).  This is “in many ways 
the most damaging, because it amounts to a denial that Jews ex-
ist as a distinct or identifiable group.”15   
These explanations, because they are undesired conse-
quences of radical constructivism, are deemed sufficient to estab-
lish a case against this mode of thought: “Having deconstructed 
merit into pure power, radical constructivists face an implication 
they will surely find wholly unpalatable – for if merit is merely 
group power, then Jewish success becomes the fruit of Jewish 
power.  That way lies madness.”16 
Finding radical constructivism undesirable, Farber and 
Sherry assess three alternative theories.  The ‘arbitrariness’ view 
argues that, “[b]ecause certain groups were, for whatever reason, 
non-participants during the creation of the standard, they tend to 
be excluded by those standards.”17  However, this view’s lack of 
normative basis does not allow any judgments against discrimi-
natory policies.18  The ‘objectivist’ view holds, “completely ob-
jective, timeless standards of merit do exist, [but] there can be no 
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 guarantee that we have reached a final understanding of those 
standards.19  Farber and Sherry prefer the pragmatist view, 
which is aligned with the objectivist belief in standards, but 
“values tradition as the essential foundation for intellectual and 
social progress.”20 
Farber and Sherry adopt a useful and optimistic definition 
of objectivity, consistent with their moderate politics.  Objectiv-
ity is “the aspiration to eliminate beliefs based on bias, personal 
idiosyncrasy, fiat, or careless investigation.”21  Because it relies 
upon aspiration, Farber and Sherry’s objective merit, premised 
on the meritocratic ideal, allows for evolving standards of merit 
not entrenched in the status quo and allows for groups to achieve 
disproportionate success.   
Objectivism and pragmatism seem initially consistent with 
this objective merit allowing for criticism of existing concepts.  
Objectivism acknowledges that “[a]n objective standard can be 
distorted by the limited vision of those in power.”22  Pragmatism 
“neither reifies tradition nor denies the importance of experi-
mentation.”23  However, even armed with the best intentions in 
pursuing objective merit, just as groups in power may exercise 
limited vision within the objectivist framework, Farber and 
Sherry fall victim to lapses in objectivity leading to unintended 
consequences.  In arguing against radical constructivism and for 
Asian and Jewish merit, they demonstrate: (1) careless investi-
gation, (2) fiat, and (3) bias or personal idiosyncrasy. 
RADICAL CONSTRUCTIVISM AND PRAGMATISM          
COMPARED 
CARELESS INVESTIGATION 
The disproportionately higher incomes and disproportionate 
representation of Asian and Jewish Americans in higher educa-
tion brings Farber and Sherry to the conclusion that “[b]y almost 
every measure of success, both groups succeed at far higher 
rates than White Gentile Americans.”24  This conclusion is hasty 
in three major respects, showing careless investigation on Farber 
and Sherry’s part. 
First, Farber and Sherry arbitrarily compare the single eth-
nicity of Jewish Americans, to a racial category, Asian Ameri-
cans, which contains dozens of ethnicities.25  Farber and Sherry 
use the identifiers “Chinese American,” “Japanese American,” 
and “Korean American” interchangeably with the general cate-
gory, “Asian Americans,” and do not mention Vietnamese, 
Cambodian, Hmong, Indian, or Pakistani Americans, etc.  Far-
ber and Sherry consolidate the diverse Asian American commu-
nity into a singular identity, falsely analogizing the alleged suc-
cess of Chinese, Japanese, and sometimes Korean Americans as 
representative of the entire Asian American community.  
Focusing on the success of a single ethnically distinct mi-
nority to dispel claims of racial discrimination, especially where 
the ethnic minority is a part of the racial majority in America, is 
imprecise.  In fact, Farber and Sherry argue against themselves 
by citing statistics that demonstrate that economic success is 
racially dependent, not racially neutral:  Jewish Americans are 
the most economically successful White ethnic group.  Chinese 
and Japanese Americans are the most economically successful 
Asian American ethnic groups.  In 1970, Jewish Americans 
earned 172% of the average American income, but their Asian 
analogs, the Chinese and Japanese Americans, earned 40% and 
60% less, respectively.26  This data tends to reinforce that 
Whites and Asians are not on par in America.   
Second, Farber and Sherry do not consider other fundamen-
tal factors that would allow proper analysis of the data.  The 
cited statistics on incomes do not control for the levels of educa-
tion Chinese, Japanese, and Korean Americans achieve.  In fact, 
the data shows that although Asian Americans in the aggregate 
have high educational levels, their incomes do not reflect their 
education, especially compared with incomes of groups with 
similar education levels.27  Asian immigrants, in particular, do 
not attain achievement commensurate to their skills and educa-
tion.  
Third, Farber and Sherry make the far-ranging assertion that 
economic status and representation in higher education accounts 
for “almost every measure of success.”  There are many other 
vital measures of success by which Asian Americans do not 
succeed at rates higher than Whites.28  For example, Asian 
Americans endure stereotypes as the model minority, perpetual 
foreigners, or passive/submissive peoples.29  Asian Americans 
are often depicted in mainstream media in stereotypical and ar-
bitrary ways.30  Asian Americans are regular targets of hate 
crime.31  Despite economic success and educational attainment, 
a glass ceiling bars Asian Americans from obtaining promotions 
to higher levels of management.32  Asian Americans are also not 
perceived as needing affirmative action even though they suffer 
discrimination.33  At worst, Asian Americans are pitted against 
other minorities resulting in catastrophic financial and psycho-
logical, i.e., Korean American small business owners in the Los 
Angeles riots, or they are “scapegoated” resulting in a unique 
deprivation of civil rights, i.e., Japanese American internment.  
Thus, Farber and Sherry’s claim that Asian Americans succeed 
at far higher rates than White Americans neglects to consider the 
diversity of Asian Americans, the disproportionate effort they 
expend, and other substantial indicia of success.  These omis-
sions show careless investigation. 
FIAT 
Farber and Sherry endorse an alternative mode of thought 
called “pragmatism,” espoused by jurists like Richard Posner.  
Pragmatists believe “current conceptions of objectivity, knowl-
edge, and merit may be flawed, but are necessary starting points 
in analysis,”34 and they “recognize the importance of logic and 
clear thinking.”35  Under Farber and Sherry’s pragmatism, the 
degree of deference to be given to current conceptions of merit 
is vague and impractical.  If current conceptions are necessary 
starting points in analysis, this does not suggest that a presump-
tion should weigh heavily in favor of keeping them.  For exam-
ple, a starting point can be analogized to a hypothesis in the sci-
entific method.  In the face of sufficient evidence to suggest 
otherwise, a hypothesis, the starting point in analysis, can be 
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readily rejected as a tentative explanation.  Similarly, if current 
conceptions of merit cease to explain differences in success rates 
among ethnic groups, they should be discarded, not given con-
tinued deference. 
Nevertheless Farber and Sherry argue that existing stan-
dards should be given the “benefit of the doubt.”36  This standard 
suggests greater deference than starting points in analysis.  The 
article even inflates this standard, eventually stating that existing 
standards should have a “rebuttable presumption of validity.”37  
Current merit then: (1) is to be a necessary starting point; (2) is 
to be given the benefit of the doubt; (3) and finally, is to receive 
a rebuttable presumption of validity.  It is not readily apparent 
how this multifaceted characterization of pragmatism is ex-
pressly distinct from radical constructivism.   
In fact, both radical constructivism and pragmatism emerge 
as subjective viewpoints: radical constructivism exists on the 
notion that merit is socially constructed by dominant groups to 
maintain their hegemony; and pragmatism defers to tradition, 
but recognizes that “current conceptions of objectivity, knowl-
edge, and merit may be flawed.”38  The only difference between 
the critiques is that Farber and Sherry subjectively judge stan-
dards in a context favoring tradition.   
So even while Farber and Sherry classify pragmatism as an 
“alternative”39 to radical constructivism, this brand of pragma-
tism may just represent another branch of radical constructivism 
catering just another group, i.e., White European Americans.  
Farber and Sherry fail to distinguish their definition of pragma-
tism from radical constructivism, thus evincing fiat and failing 
the second element of objectivity. 
BIAS 
As a key premise of their argument, Farber and Sherry 
claim radical constructivism allows only racist and anti-Semitic 
explanations for Asian and Jewish success.  “These groups have 
obtained disproportionate shares of important social goods; if 
they have not earned their shares fairly on the merits, then they 
must have done so unjustly.”40  As summarized above, Farber 
and Sherry propose four available theories for Asian and Jewish 
success in America under the radical constructivism critique: 
conspiracy, cultural imitation, cultural infiltration, and statistical 
anomaly.  These explanations are highly infused with connota-
tions derived from the fear experienced by those in the position 
of the majority.   
By not adequately considering minority viewpoints, Farber 
and Sherry ignore two universes of explanations that do not 
have the same anti-Asian and anti-Semitic consequences.  That 
is, (1) explanations blaming the majority, and (2) explanations 
recognizing Asian and Jewish resourcefulness in overcoming 
culturally discriminatory barriers erected by the majority.  The 
former suggests neutral characterizations of Asian and Jewish 
Americans.  The latter suggests positive characterizations.  Both 
suggest that negative characterizations of the majority and cur-
rent critiques of merit are not objective. 
 Many critical theorists would say that Asians and Jews 
succeed as a consequence of a powerful and pervasive majority 
conspiracy to maintain the subordination of minority groups.41  
For example, cultural imitation can be explained in Asian and 
Jewish-neutral terms if one believes majority culture has sub-
sumed and oppressed Asian and Jewish culture – the marginali-
zation of these cultures results from majority intolerance of dif-
ference.  Asian and Jewish Americans must assimilate because 
they otherwise face alienation from mainstream participation.   
Cultural infiltration in Asian and Jewish-neutral terms can 
be explained by cultural overlap in their preferences and prac-
tices.  The fact that mainstream Americans enjoy aspects of mi-
nority culture may be seen as their choice.  The better question 
is who determines what is incorporated into mainstream society, 
not what gets incorporated.  
Finally, statistical anomaly might be explained by a group 
having the attributes most appropriate for success in a given 
cultural moment.  Success need not be a result of a particular 
group being “better” than another, but simply out of being the 
right group, at the right place, at the right time, in the right con-
text.   
Minorities may be able to attain above parity success in a 
system biased against their interests by expending disproportion-
ate effort and expense.42  History contains countless stories of 
immigrant underdogs defeating the odds, but in the broad con-
text of immigrant success, these stories are rare and do not vali-
date the oppressive regime.  With this considered, Asian and 
Jewish American successes serve as an example of how two 
groups achieved financial and educational successes despite the 
structural barriers impeding their progress. 
Asian and Jewish Americans’ relative success may be at-
tributed to their cultural contributions to mainstream society and 
their status as cultural “chameleons.”  Cultural “chameleons” are 
less threatening because of their adaptability.  Both attributes 
carry positive connotations and potentially remove dependency 
on race and ethnicity to explain success.  In light of these alter-
nate explanations, current standards may still be in need of revi-
sion. 
Giving disproportionate weight to limited perspective leads 
Farber and Sherry to seemingly logical double standards.  The 
potential consequences of radical constructivism upon two spe-
cific groups is deemed dispositive for rejecting it altogether.  
Farber and Sherry also forgo due inquiry into the existing effect 
of current standards on other groups: they prefer a conception of 
merit that has specific desired outcomes: no anti-Asianism, no 
anti-Semitism, notwithstanding whether the current conception 
of merit is presently anti-Latino or anti-Black.  Taking on the 
majority perspective allows Farber and Sherry to pursue the 
same line of effects-based reasoning they criticize critical theo-
rists for using.43   
LESSONS OF AN ASPIRATIONAL OBJECTIVITY 
Farber and Sherry’s objectivity contingent upon aspiration 
is commendable, but in arguing against radical constructivism, 
they fail to achieve it. Advocating for current standards without 
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due examination of relevant perspectives, precise definitions, 
and thorough investigation hinders the pursuit of objectivity.  
Farber and Sherry evince bias by ignoring alternative explana-
tions for Asian and Jewish success that are possible under radi-
cal constructivism.  They evince fiat by proposing a pragmatist 
model that has multiple interchangeable standards of deference 
to be afforded to tradition.  They evince careless investigation 
by ignoring considerations that would provide a fuller and more 
accurate assessment of Asian and Jewish success.  Through bias, 
fiat, and careless investigation, Farber and Sherry are led astray 
from their ideal of objectivity.   
But this is not to say Farber and Sherry should not have 
spoken.  Farber and Sherry express a sincere conviction about 
the deficiencies of radical constructivism.44  If we keep quiet for 
fear of being wrong or too subjective, it is possible we may 
never speak and the fruits of public debate may never be en-
joyed.  Refusing to engage in debate leads to the “twin perils of 
an unthinking adherence to tradition and an unreflective over 
eagerness for change”45 that Farber and Sherry fear.  However, 
when we go about assessing their argument, we should remain 
adherents to the principles required by objectivity.  Where tradi-
tion is excessively optimistic, criticism is left out in the cold, 
with no entry into the house of knowledge.  Where criticism is 
excessively pessimistic, tradition is a collection of foolish tales, 
with no attachment to the tree of history. 
CONCLUSION 
Farber and Sherry’s article, “Is the Radical Critique of 
Merit Anti-Semitic?” draws an arbitrary line between criticism 
and objectivity by addressing the distinction between radical 
constructivism and pragmatism within the context of merit.  A 
society adopting strategies of exclusive arbitrary line-drawing 
generates barriers to debate that will not provide the freedoms 
and equal opportunity it might hope to achieve.  A better model 
for objective merit balances criticism and tradition. 
If even the best intentions lead to undesired outcomes, a 
case for opening the debate is made.  Bridging the perceived gap 
between radical constructivism and pragmatism, as opposed to 
creating it, encourages dialogue to occur and critics to more 
readily realize an aspirational objectivity. 
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ABORTION, EUGENICS, AND A THREAT TO DIVERSITY 
 
By Chris McChesney* 
A fter nearly three months of pregnancy, Mary sits in her doctor’s office anxiously awaiting to hear the results.  Though still in her first trimester, Mary’s doctor ex-
plained to her that it is becoming more common, and even more 
accurate, to have certain screening tests done early.1  Today 
Mary will learn if the child growing inside of her will be born 
with Down syndrome, an abnormality in the 21st chromosome 
that usually leads to mental retardation.2  If the test results show 
that her child will have Down syndrome, Mary will be forced to 
make a host of difficult decisions, the hardest being whether or 
not to carry the fetus to term.  The majority of parents-to-be in 
Mary’s position, whose fetus tests positive for Down syndrome, 
choose to have an abortion rather than bringing the fetus to term 
and raising the child or allowing the child to be adopted.3  Many 
doctors counsel their patients in such circumstances to undergo 
abortions and doctors who treat patients with Down syndrome 
report seeing fewer and fewer patients.4  While not government 
mandated, such abortions are government sanctioned even when 
the pregnancy is at a later stage and when other selective abor-
tions are not permitted.5 
The reduction of people born with 
a disorder that can cripple families both 
emotionally and financially may be 
seen as an accomplishment of modern 
science and medicine.  Alternatively, 
given our country’s history, the drop in 
the number of Down syndrome babies 
can be viewed as the eradication of a 
distinct class of people.  Eugenics is 
believed to be non-existent in the 
United States today, but the systematic selective breeding of hu-
mans remains a current part of society.6   The selective abortion 
of fetuses with Down syndrome is not referred to as eugenics, 
but the parallel is easy to make.  The future consequences of en-
hanced understanding of our genetic makeup and advances in 
prenatal screening foreshadow a society that justifies eugenics as 
a means to creating the perfect child. 
This article first discusses the history of eugenics in the U.S. 
and compares it with today’s treatment of prenatal detection of 
Down syndrome.  Drawing on this comparison, the article will 
discuss potential advances in genetic screening and how such 
advances may be used for eugenic purposes.  Specifically, the 
article will focus on the potential threat genetic advances and 
selective abortion pose to diversity, in particular, homosexuality, 
via a eugenics-like desire for the perfect child.  This article will 
also discuss the genetic component of eugenics and the biologi-
cal roots of homosexuality, arguing that homosexuality is not a 
choice, but a predetermined trait.  After discussing several scien-
tific studies and drawing the conclusion from them that there is a 
genetic link to homosexuality, the article will pose a hypothetical 
in which parents have the option to abort a fetus solely for the 
reason that the child would more likely than not be homosexual.  
Finally, this article will argue that while it may be a form of 
eugenics and threat to diversity to abort a fetus based on Down 
syndrome or the hypothetical detection of homosexuality, the 
woman’s right to choose must not be infringed upon, whatever 
the reason for her choice. 
AMERICA’S EUGENICS PAST 
The eugenics movement was most prominent in the United 
States from the early twentieth century through World War II.7  
Eugenics, first developed by Francis Galton, stemmed from early 
knowledge of genetics and a desire among intellectuals to im-
prove society.8  Society’s ills were blamed on groups of people 
who had traits that scientists believed to be inherited, including: 
disabilities, drug or alcohol addiction, homelessness, and 
“feeble-mindedness.”9  Backed by scientists, intellectuals, and 
politicians of the time, many states, beginning with Indiana in 
1907, passed laws based on the principles of eugenics.10  By the 
1920s, twenty-seven states had codified 
such laws, most of which called for the 
mandatory sterilization of certain 
groups of people.11 
       While early court cases began to 
limit sterilization laws, the Supreme 
Court upheld them in a 1927 case, Buck 
v. Bell.12  The issue in Buck stemmed 
from a Virginia court’s decision order-
ing the sterilization of eighteen-year 
old Carrie Buck based on her status as 
an institutionalized person in the Virginia State Colony for Epi-
leptics and Feeble Minded.13  Virginia institutionalized Buck 
because she was a “deviant” who had given birth to an illegiti-
mate child, despite evidence that her pregnancy was the result of 
a rape.14  Justice Holmes, writing for the eight-justice majority, 
described Buck as, “the daughter of a feeble minded mother in 
the same institution, and the mother of an illegitimate feeble 
minded child,” and determined in an infamous quote that,        
“[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough.”15  Ruling in favor 
of the state, Holmes compared the sterilization to previously up-
held mandatory vaccination policies, thus upholding sterilization 
laws and solidifying eugenics as valid public policy.16  Ulti-
mately, over 60,000 people in the United States were lawfully 
sterilized.17 
Only after the horrors of Nazi Germany and the Nuremburg 
trials, did the United States begin to view eugenics in a negative 
light.18  However, although sterilization laws were not heavily 
enforced, states were slow to repeal them; between 1970 and 
1974, North Carolina sterilized twenty-three persons.19  The fed-
eral government only banned the use of federal funds for sterili-
Eugenics is believed to be non-
existent in the United States     
today, but the systemic selective 
breeding of humans remains a 
current part of society. 
 Spring 2006 17 
zation in 1978 and as of 2004, seven states still had sterilization 
laws on the books.20  Additionally, Buck has never been over-
turned, though a law requiring the sterilization of criminals was 
overturned in 1942 (largely because criminality was not proven 
inherited trait).21  The Court has also cited to Buck multiple 
times, referring to it as valid case law, most notably in Roe v. 
Wade to support the proposition that the state can impose some 
limits on the right to privacy.22  The Court’s use of Buck as an 
example on allowable limits on the right to privacy is far from 
the historical support of eugenics.  Indeed, the Court noted its 
unfavorable opinion of eugenics when it reviewed Roe in 
Planned Parenthood of Southern Pennsylvania v. Casey.23 
DOWN SYNDROME 
Down syndrome is characterized by multiple physical traits 
including flat facial features, dysplastic ears, and an enlarged 
tongue in comparison to the mouth.24  It is also associated with 
mild to severe mental retardation.25  The cause of Down syn-
drome is the nondisjunction of chromosome 21, resulting in 
cells carrying three of the twenty-first chromosome instead of 
the normal pair.26  This faulty cell division occurs in either the 
sperm or the egg prior to conception.27  Prenatal testing can ac-
curately diagnose Down syndrome in fetuses through several 
procedures: chorionic villus sampling (CVS), amniocentesis, 
and percutaneous umbilical blood sampling (PUBS).28  While 
these tests are typically done during the second trimester, new 
studies are beginning to show that testing during the first trimes-
ter is more effective.29 
An estimated 80% - 90% of Down 
syndrome fetuses are aborted, indicat-
ing it is a common practice among 
women who have learned that the fe-
tus they are carrying has Down syn-
drome.30  This practice is generally 
accepted among academics and the general public, with some 
going as far as saying that, “prospective parents have a moral 
obligation to undergo prenatal testing and to terminate their 
pregnancy to avoid bringing forth a child with a disability.”31  
Analogizing such a position with the eugenics philosophy of our 
past is not difficult.  After all, people with mental disabilities 
were one of the groups forcefully sterilized; preventing their 
very existence is the ultimate form of breeding them out of soci-
ety.32 
Recently, the comparison to eugenics has begun to be pub-
licly discussed, generally by those associated with the Pro-Life 
movement.33  Proponents of selectively aborting fetuses with 
Down syndrome avoid the eugenics comparison and point to the 
emotional and financial burdens a child with Down syndrome 
imposes on a family, concluding that neither a woman, nor soci-
ety, should be forced to carry such a burden.34  The debate 
reached the Senate with the introduction of the ‘Prenatally Diag-
nosed Condition Awareness Act’ by Senator Brownback (R-KS) 
and co-sponsored by Senator Kennedy (D-MA).35  The bill 
would not limit a woman’s right to choose; rather, it would in-
crease available information to women after prenatal tests detect 
Down syndrome and prior to their decision of whether or not to 
carry the fetus to term.36  Principally, the bill would expand 
available information about Down syndrome, create access to 
support services, and establish a national registry for those wish-
ing to adopt children with Down syndrome.37  At the close of the 
2005 legislative session, the Senate Committee on Health, Edu-
cation, Labor, and Pensions was considering the bill. 
GENETICS OF HOMOSEXUALITY 
While Down syndrome has a clear genetic link detectable 
through prenatal screening, allowing for the current eugenics-
like treatment of fetuses with Down syndrome, homosexuality is 
not currently detectable in the womb.  The two are not facially 
comparable; Down syndrome is considered a genetic disorder, 
while homosexuality is no longer deemed a disease or disor-
der.38  For purposes of this article, however, the two will be 
compared as minority groups, whose members do not choose 
their status as a minority.  Additionally, the classification of 
selective abortions as eugenics in cases of fetuses with Down 
syndrome will be used in a hypothetical by replacing the detec-
tion of Down syndrome with the theoretical detection of homo-
sexuality in the womb.  Prior to the hypothetical, this article will 
discuss what is currently known about the genetics of homo-
sexuality to give support to the premise that prenatal screening 
will eventually have the capability to detect homosexuality in 
fetuses. 
      Though some argue that homo-
sexuality is a choice of lifestyle,39 sci-
ence is providing more and more con-
clusive evidence that sexuality is a 
predetermined trait that cannot be 
changed.40  These studies continually 
bolster the contention that homosexuality is not a choice.41 
Unlike many predetermined traits that can be linked to one gene 
or chromosome, sexuality is believed to be determined by both 
genetics and conditions in the womb.42  In the early 1990s, a 
“gay” gene was discovered, but the results were not repeated 
and the study sample was small.43  The study’s result indicated 
the locus Xq28 (a point on the X chromosome) had a higher 
probability of being the same among homosexual brothers, sug-
gesting the gene has a link to the trait of homosexuality.44  Since 
then, a host of genetic discoveries have been made along with 
studies showing anatomical and physiological similarities 
among gay men and studies of homosexuality in other animals, 
including sheep, penguins, and fruit flies.45 
In 2005, two separate groups of scientists published articles 
detailing their studies, which located a gene in fruit flies that has 
the ability to change sexual orientation.46  The gene, which ge-
neticists refer to as the fruitless (fru) gene, controls male court-
ship behavior and orientation, but not sexual anatomy.47  There 
are both male specific fru (fruM) and female specific fru (fruF) 
An estimated 80% - 90% of 
Down syndrome fetuses are 
aborted... 
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genes.  When geneticists spliced the female version into male 
flies, the male ceased courtship of females, and when paired 
with other male flies spliced with the female version, showed 
male-male courtship behavior.48  Similar results occurred in fe-
males; when the male version was spliced into female flies, they 
began to actively court other females not spliced with the male 
gene.49  While the study does not prove such a gene exists in 
humans, it does show there is a genetic link to sexual behaviors 
in fruit flies, which share a majority of genes with humans.50 
Along with genetics, several anatomical and physiological 
characteristics have been studied and compared between homo-
sexuals and heterosexuals.51  Sweat glands produce pheromones 
as a response to sexual behavior.52  By monitoring brain activity 
of sexually dimorphic nuclei, Swedish scientists determined that 
homosexual men were aroused in a similar manner as women by 
pheromones produced by men.53  Several anthropometric 
(measurement and characteristics of the body) studies have also 
been conducted, with the most conclusive study relating to fin-
ger length.54  The majority of men have ring fingers that are 
longer than the index finger and women tend have approxi-
mately equal length ring and index fingers.55  Lesbians, how-
ever, tend to have a ring-index finger ratio similar to men, and 
while not all gay men share the female ratio, men with the fe-
male finger ratio tend to be more sensitive and nurturing.56  An-
other common trait among homosexual men and women often 
appears in the brain.  In heterosexual men, the two brain hemi-
spheres are more specialized whereas women have brain hemi-
spheres that are more similar and share functions.  Homosexual 
men’s brains show the same relationship among the hemispheres 
as women’s brain.57 
Recently scientists have begun studying the brains of homo-
sexual male sheep (rams).58  Among domesticated rams, ap-
proximately 6% - 8% only court and mate with other rams.59  
Wild rams also have shown homosexual courtship behavior, as 
do over 450 other animal species, including penguins, ostriches, 
and chimpanzees.60  Scientists in Oregon have begun investigat-
ing why some rams are homosexual and have discovered differ-
ences in the brains of heterosexual rams and homosexual rams.61  
The sexually dimorphic nucleus is typically larger in males than 
it is in females, but gay rams have a sexually dimorphic nuclei 
that resembles the smaller nuclei found in ewes as opposed to 
other rams.62  A 1991 study showed similar results among the 
sexually dimorphic nucleus of humans.63 
While these studies do not show a direct link between genet-
ics and homosexuality, they do support that homosexuality is 
not a choice.64  Genes merely code proteins, and there are sev-
eral steps between genes and behavior.65  Most scientists, how-
ever, will acknowledge that homosexuality is genetic, although 
environmental factors, such as testosterone levels in the womb, 
likely play a role.66  Given this, it is not hard to hypothesize that 
scientists will find a direct link to homosexuality.  However, as 
geneticist Dean Hamer, a leading researcher noted, many hetero-
sexual scientists do not research the so-called “gay gene” be-
cause they do not want to offend anyone.67  After all, “if scien-
tists identify a ‘gay gene,’ will expectant parents use it for selec-
tive abortion?”68 
HOMOSEXUAL HYPOTHETICAL:                                 
DIVERSITY VERSUS CHOICE 
The potential detection of homosexuality is far different 
from the prenatal detection of Down syndrome.69  As scientists 
learn more about the roots of homosexuality and its genetic 
links, it may become possible to determine that a child will 
likely be born gay.  This determination, like all prenatal testing, 
may not be 100% accurate, but a doctor may be able to tell par-
ents that their child has a certain percent chance of being gay.70  
If this percentage provides a more likely than not chance that the 
child will be gay, parents will face a difficult question -- should 
they have a child knowing that he or she will be born gay? 
Often, some of the biggest fears expressed by parents when 
their child comes out as being gay are based on their child’s 
safety and future happiness.71  Being gay in a heteronormative72 
society can mean facing discrimination, misunderstanding, and 
even danger.73  Hate crimes against gays remain a problem and 
acceptance, or even tolerance, is never assured.74  In light of 
these concerns, would a parent-to-be knowingly bring a child 
into the world who could be hated solely for something they 
cannot control?75  Would a parent-to-be whose religious convic-
tions tell them homosexuality is sin and unacceptable bring a 
child into the world if they believed they could never accept for 
who the child truly would be?  Would parents view their child’s 
homosexuality as an imperfection like many view Down Syn-
drome? 
A child should be loved for who they are when they are 
born, whether gay or straight, disabled or not.  However, as has 
been the case with Down syndrome, parents often want the per-
fect child and some choose to abort what is perceived to be an 
imperfect fetus.  A controversy erupted in Britain when a parent 
was allowed to abort a child past the point of viability because it 
was determined that the child would have a cleft palate.76  Given 
this controversy, along with current homophobic attitudes, it is 
not outlandish to imagine a parent aborting a fetus because the 
child will be born gay.  If that were to become the norm, abor-
tion could begin to pose an even bigger threat to diversity than it 
presently does. 
Considering this country’s history, it is not unreasonable to 
believe U.S. citizens would attempt to selectively remove a 
group of people from the population by practicing eugenics; in 
fact, it is not outrageous to assert that eugenics is alive and well 
as demonstrated by the abortion of the vast majority of fetuses 
with Down syndrome.77  As genetics and prenatal testing be-
come more advanced, abortion may become a legitimate means 
to lowering diversity and reigniting eugenics as parents strive to 
have “perfect” heterosexual children.  This would truly be a 
travesty, not only to the minority communities affected, but to 
the nation as whole.  Diversity plays a vital role in this country 
 and should be protected, but should it be protected to the detri-
ment of woman’s right to choose? 
CONCLUSION 
The choice of whether or not to have a child is a personal 
one.  Thus, a woman’s right to choose should not be infringed 
upon, no matter her reasoning.  Despite the importance of diver-
sity and the importance of protecting the rights of minorities, 
including homosexuals and those with disabilities, placing re-
strictions on the allowed reasons for having an abortion pre-
viability would arguably violate the standard of an “undue bur-
den” set out in Casey, which was recently reaffirmed in Ayotte v. 
Planned Parenthood of Northern New England.78  A state may 
offer alternatives, educate those wishing to obtain an abortion, 
and develop other such regulations with regard to the right to 
choose; a state regulation, however, may not impose an undue 
burden on a woman’s right to choose.79  Telling a woman what 
reasons are valid to have an abortion and that she is not allowed 
to have an abortion if she has different reasons would certainly 
be an undue burden to place on a woman’s right to choose. 
Abortion and advancements in genetics have the potential to 
become, and within some communities have already become, 
another form of eugenics.  Even so, regulating the reasons for a 
woman’s choice is not the solution, nor is halting advancements 
in genetic technology; rather, the solution lies in education.  The 
current tragedy of aborting fetuses with Down syndrome can 
and should be curbed with legislation similar to the bill intro-
duced by Senator Brownback and Senator Kennedy.  Knowing 
that people with Down syndrome lead happy, healthy lives, and 
that there are parents who want to adopt unwanted Down syn-
drome babies may change some decisions to abort, without plac-
ing an undue burden on their right to do so.  Similarly, as scien-
tists learn more about the roots of homosexuality, people may 
begin to accept that sexuality is not a choice.  As acceptance and 
rights increase for the LGBT community, parents will not fear as 
much for the safety of their gay children, and they themselves 
may become more accepting of having a gay child. 
Diversity and protecting individual rights are a vital part of 
this country.  However, in this case, the legal system can only 
protect diversity so much before it may interfere with individual 
rights, such as placing an undue burden on a woman’s right to 
choose.  When this happens, it becomes the task of the individ-
ual to advocate and protect diversity.  Twenty years from now, 
Mary’s daughter may have to decide whether to abort her own 
fetus, which she has just learned will be gay.  If she decides to 
abort her child and further the practice of eugenics, it will be 
because our country failed to educate, promote, and accept all 
forms of diversity — including homosexuality — not the failure 
to restrict a woman’s right to choose. 
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SPOTLIGHT ON MICHAEL NAVA:  
WRITING THE WRONGS FOR ALL 
 
By María Lucero Ortiz* 
M ost  studen ts studying for the California bar 
could not imagine writing a 
novel, but Michael Nava was 
unlike most law students.  
Late one night, after graduat-
ing from Stanford University 
Law School, he began to 
write The Little Death, the 
first of his seven-volume, 
critically acclaimed, legal 
mystery series.  His fictional 
protagonist, Henry Rios, is an openly gay, Latino criminal de-
fense attorney. In a recent interview with The Modern American, 
Nava explained his motives for creating Henry by citing a com-
ment from Toni Morrison: “She once said that she wrote the kind 
of books she wished she could have had to read when she was 
growing up as an African American.  I wish that I had read 
books with characters like Henry Rios when I was growing up as 
a gay Latino.”   
Professionally, Nava has dedicated the majority of his ca-
reer to the government sector, working as one of the few Latino 
appellate lawyers.  Personally, Nava has created support systems 
for minority communities.  This spotlight focuses on Nava's con-
tributions to social justice as an author and an attorney, in and 
out of the limelight, and the lessons to be learned from his 
achievements.   
Nava grew up in a predominately working-class Mexican 
neighborhood in Sacramento, Califor-
nia, where his maternal family settled 
in 1920 after escaping the Mexican 
Revolution.  His grandmother was an 
influential force whose piety and hu-
mility were highlighted by her Catholic 
beliefs.  As a precocious child, Nava 
constantly read.  He was the first per-
son in his family to attend college, where he excelled and ac-
quired a special affinity for literature and writing.  He fondly 
remembers debating the merits of one poet over another with his 
friends until the early hours of the morning.   
After graduating from Colorado College cum laude, he was 
awarded a Thomas Watson Fellowship to study abroad.  He 
spent the next year in Buenos Aires and Madrid working on 
translations of the great Spanish American poet Ruben Dario 
(1867-1916).  Returning home, he decided to go to law school 
after briefly contemplating a graduate degree in English or His-
tory.  Law school was a difficult experience for psychological 
rather than academic, reasons.  "I felt like such an outsider,” he 
remembers, “I was no longer part of the working-class brown 
community where I grew up, but I would never be a part of the 
upper middle-class white society of my classmates, many of 
whom had been groomed for law school from a young age.  I 
think many of us from working-class minority backgrounds suf-
fer this kind of culture shock when we enter professional schools 
and the emotional energy required to adjust to the culture of that 
environment can take a toll academically.” 
He continued to write during law school, winning awards 
for his poetry.  Eventually, he turned to fiction and specifically, 
to the mystery genre, to express his own history while giving life 
to Henry Rios.  During Nava’s youth, society considered homo-
sexuals as sick, sinners, or criminals.  The only gay person he 
encountered as a child was a drag queen uncle.  Nava could not 
identify with these stereotypes.  Enter Henry Rios, a dynamic 
character who, as a recovering alcoholic, deals with loving and 
losing his lover to AIDS, being an openly gay Latino in Califor-
nia, and finding a balance between what is morally right and 
what is legally just.   
Nava described the process of writing his first book as a 
"lark," for which he had modest expectations.  The Little Death 
was rejected by thirteen publishers before Alyson Books, an in-
dependent gay publisher, brought it out in 1986 and encouraged 
him to write a follow-up.  His hard work paid off when his sec-
ond book, Goldenboy, was critically acclaimed by the New York 
Times, which described him as a brilliant storyteller.  Over the 
next thirteen years, Nava wrote five more novels, received six 
Lambda Literary awards, and was awarded the Whitehead 
Award for Lifetime Achievement by a 
gay or lesbian writer.  He also received 
a grant in creative writing from the 
California Arts Council and an honor-
ary degree as a Doctor of Humane Let-
ters from his alma mater, Colorado 
College.  His books have been trans-
lated into to French, German, Japanese, 
and Spanish.  In addition, he also co-authored Created Equal: 
Why Gay Rights Matter to America.   
The last of the Henry Rios novels, Rag & Bone, was pub-
lished in 2001 with widespread acclaim.  For many of his read-
ers, Nava’s decision to end the series was a personal loss because 
they had come to regard Henry Rios as a friend.  Despite the 
series ending, Nava continues to write, working on a novel based 
loosely on the early life of Mexican silent film star Ramon No-
varro (1899-1969). 
At the beginning of his literary career, Nava was viewed 
largely as a gay writer, but he is now recognized as an important 
Courtesy Stathis Orphanos 
For me, being an educated      
Latino from a working-class   
family was more alienating than   
being gay... 
 Latino writer, too.  Each novel explores Henry’s psychological 
struggles and the complex lives of “ordinary” people.  Nava 
portrays very honest and explicit accounts of gay love and sex 
and the intimate tensions of an upwardly-mobile, educated La-
tino.  “Henry isn’t me, but I borrowed from my psychological 
experience to describe his character, especially the challenges he 
faces as an educated Latino from a working-class family.  In my 
personal experience, being educated was more alienating than 
being gay in terms of dealing with my family.  I think many 
Latinos and Latinas who entered the professions also face this 
challenge.” 
Outside the limelight of his literary celebrity, Nava dedi-
cated his legal career to pursing social justice through the gov-
ernment sector.  Nava insisted that, “attorneys of color need to 
be everywhere.  From corporate counsel to the bench and the 
human rights organizations, we have to be in a position to insti-
tutionalize the diversification of the legal profession that has 
begun with my generation of lawyers.  This is the special chal-
lenge for law students of color – to build on what we began in 
the 70s and 80s.”  He also stated that attorneys of color have a 
responsibility to work directly or through philanthropic activities 
to expand access to justice for marginalized communities.  In his 
free time, Nava is an active member of the Most Holy Re-
deemer, a largely gay and lesbian Catholic parish in San Fran-
cisco with a deep tradition of social justice activism.  He heads a 
project in the parish to fund education for children in Africa 
orphaned by AIDS.  He is also a role model and a benefactor for 
a charter school that sets high educational standards for first-
generation, college bound Latino students.  He contributes a 
percentage of his annual income to charitable and cultural insti-
tutions.  “We have to learn to become philanthropists,” he says, 
“however modest our contributions may be.” 
While practicing appellate law at a firm, a former Stanford 
classmate encouraged Nava to apply for a judicial position with 
Justice Arleigh Woods, the first African American woman ap-
pointed to the California Court of Appeals.  After ten years with 
Justice Woods, he was invited to apply for his current position 
by a former colleague in the city attorney’s office.  "Judicial 
attorneys and law clerks can have a huge influence in shaping 
the direction of the law, but there are very few attorneys of color 
in those positions because they are mostly filled through the Old 
Boys Network.  We need to establish our own network.”  This 
kind of diversification among judicial attorneys and law clerks 
will result in more inclusive and fair results in the cases that 
come before the appellate judiciary.  He advises law students 
and practicing attorneys to perfect their legal writing skills and 
to seek judicial clerkships to break into the profession as a judi-
cial attorney. 
In his current position as a judicial attorney, Nava works 
for Justice Carlos R. Moreno in the California Supreme Court.  
Justice Carlos R. Moreno is only the third Latino to sit on the 
California high court.  Nava deals with complex legal issues in 
every area of civil and criminal law on one of the country’s most 
active and well-respected courts.  He is aware that his personal 
beliefs and his professional responsibilities do not always mesh.  
For example, while he is personally opposed to the death pen-
alty, he has worked on death penalty cases in which the court 
has affirmed the death sentence.  “Once an attorney takes the 
oath to uphold the law, he agrees to set aside some of his per-
sonal beliefs regarding the wisdom of those laws,” Nava ex-
plains, “Of course, you can become an advocate to change the 
laws but I view my work within the appellate court system to be 
important enough that I trade off my personal feelings about 
some of the cases I work on in order to have some influence in 
other crucial cases.” 
As an author, Nava utilizes the written word to create a 
vision that did not exist when he was a youth; as a lawyer, he 
wields the written word to advocate for justice; and as a con-
cerned citizen, he empowers others to pass on the knowledge 
they have acquired through their legal and life experience.  Nava 
is an inspiration for all law students to write the wrongs. 
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“HUMAN GARBAGE” OR TRASH-WORTHY LAW? 
FLORIDA’S BAN ON GAY ADOPTION 
IN THE INTERNATIONAL LIGHT 
 
By Cecilia Isaacs-Blundin* 
F lorida law currently provides, “No person eligible to adopt… may adopt if that person is a homosexual.”1  Legislation to change this provision died recently in the 
Florida senate.2  Although several other U.S. states’ common law 
discourage adoption by homosexuals,3 no other state has a statute 
categorically excluding homosexuals, as a class, from adopting.  
Florida’s uncompromising current statutory ban on adoption by 
homosexuals is not only unique domestically;4 it also bucks the 
larger Western world’s trend towards expansion of adoption 
rights for gays and lesbians.5 
This article will detail the Floridian approach to homosexual 
adoption, looking at the various justifications for the existence of 
Florida’s ban on gay adoption, while also identifying approaches 
taken by selected foreign jurisdictions.  It will then put forth do-
mestic and international critiques of the Floridian justifications 
for preventing gay and lesbian adoption, and will promote a dif-
ferent interpretation of the best interest of the child standard to 
allow for gay adoption.  Finally, this article concludes with the 
assertion that, in light of international precedent, the Florida sen-
ate should have eliminated the categorical ban on adoption by 
homosexuals. 
FLORIDA’S LAW ON ADOPTION BY HOMOSEXUALS 
Florida’s adoption law allows “any person, a minor or an 
adult, [to] be adopted” by “a husband and wife jointly… an un-
married adult; or… a married person without the other 
spouse…”6  Since 1977, however, the statute has also contained 
a provision reading, “no person eligible to adopt under this stat-
ute may adopt if that person is a homosexual.”7  At least five 
congressional bills attempting to repeal the provision have been 
introduced since its enactment,8 two of which were introduced in 
the 2005 Florida senate session, but both died in committee.9 
The first 2005 bill, introduced by Senator Rich, would have 
maintained a general ban on gay adoption.  However, it would 
have allowed an exception in cases where, by clear and convinc-
ing evidence, the court finds “that the adoptee resides with the 
person proposing to adopt the adoptee, the adoptee recognizes 
the person as the adoptee’s parent, and granting the adoptee per-
manency in that home is more important to the adoptee’s devel-
opmental and psychological needs than maintaining the adoptee 
in a temporary placement.”10  The second bill, proposed by Sena-
tor Dawson, aimed to replace Florida’s current provision that “no 
homosexual may adopt under this statute if that person is a ho-
mosexual,” with a case-by-case evaluation of the best interest of 
the child.11  The new section would state: “A prospective adop-
tive parent of a minor must undergo an individual assessment of 
his or her capacity to understand and meet the needs of the par-
ticular child.”  Because none of the proposed bills passed, Flor-
ida statutory law continues to categorically prohibit adoption by 
homosexuals. 
The constitutionality of Florida’s provision banning adop-
tion by homosexuals was challenged in state and federal court. 
Over ten years ago, in Dept. of Health & Rehab. v. Cox, a Flor-
ida appeals court heard one such challenge.12  It upheld the pro-
vision as constitutional against challenges of vagueness, privacy, 
and equal protection brought by two gay men seeking to adopt a 
special needs child.13  Although the Florida Supreme Court af-
firmed the rulings, it remanded the case for further development 
of the factual record.14  The case, however, was never heard on 
remand because the plaintiffs withdrew the claim.15  Even so, 
Cox established a working definition of “homosexual,” which 
courts consider when evaluating the Florida statute.16  Cox de-
fined that a “homosexual [is] limited to applicants who are 
known to engage in current, voluntary homosexual activity,” 
thereby making “a distinction between homosexual orientation 
and homosexual activity.”17 
More recently, the constitutionality of Florida’s statutory 
ban on adoption by homosexuals has been upheld by the Elev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals in Lofton v. Dep’t of Children and 
Family Servs.18  The Lofton case has been widely publicized19 
and involved several plaintiffs, each of whose application for 
adoption was denied under the Florida statute based on his ho-
mosexuality.20  At the district court level, in Lofton v. Kearney, 
the defendants Secretary and District Administrator of Florida’s 
Department of Children and Families asserted that the Florida 
statute served two legitimate purposes.21  First, it “reflects the 
State’s moral disapproval of homosexuality consistent with the 
legislature’s right to legislate public morality.”22   Second, the 
Department of Children and Families claimed that the best inter-
ests of the child are served when he or she is “raised in a home 
stabilized by marriage, in a family consisting of both a father and 
a mother” because “married heterosexual family units [will] pro-
vide adopted children with proper gender role modeling” and 
will minimize social stigmatization.23  Like most other states, 
Florida uses the “best interest of the child” standard to make 
adoption determinations.24  In Lofton, summary judgment was 
granted based on the Department’s arguments.25  The court ac-
cepted that even if the rationales underlying the assumptions are 
flawed, “the very fact that they are ‘arguable’ is sufficient, on a 
rational basis review, to ‘immunize’ the congressional choice 
from constitutional challenge.”26  Pointing to the federal and 
Floridian Defense of Marriage Act, the court added that: 
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[H]omosexuals are not similar in all relevant 
aspects to other nonmarried adults with respect 
to [the]… best interest of the child. Nonmarried 
adults, unlike homosexuals, can get married. On 
the other hand, homosexuals cannot marry or be 
recognized as a marital unit and, thus, cannot 
meet the state’s asserted interest underlying the 
homosexual adoption provision.27 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
upheld the lower court decision.28  The opinion expounded sev-
eral of the rational bases upon which the statute could indeed be 
based.29  The court noted that Florida has a legitimate state inter-
est in furthering public morality30 and that the statute is part of a 
“broader adoption policy, designed to create adoptive homes 
that resemble the nuclear family as closely as possible.”31  Cit-
ing “the accumulated wisdom of several millennia of human 
experience” to confirmed “marital family structure” as a 
“superior model,” the court reasoned that “it is rational for Flor-
ida to conclude that it is in the best interest of adoptive children . 
. . to be placed in a home anchored by both a father and a 
mother.”32 The statute, therefore, furthers the best interest of 
children by placing them in families with adoptive mothers and 
fathers, who offer both male and female authority figures, which 
is “critical to optimal childhood development and socializa-
tion.”33 Because homosexual homes are “necessarily motherless 
or fatherless, [they] lack the stability that comes with mar-
riage.”34 
In response to the petitioners’ argument that Florida’s ban 
on homosexual adoption does not promote the nuclear family 
model insomuch as it allows unmarried heterosexuals to adopt, 
the court reasoned that the legislature could have rationally 
acted on a theory that heterosexual singles are not only more 
likely to marry eventually, but are also “better positioned than 
homosexual individuals to provide adopted children with educa-
tion and guidance relative to their sexual development through-
out pubescence and adolescence,” because the “children will 
need education and guidance after puberty concerning relation-
ships with the opposite sex.”35  Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit 
declined to rehear en banc the Lofton case, affirming the consti-
tutionality of the Florida statute.36  The American Civil Liberties 
Union subsequently petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for re-
view of the Lofton case on October 1, 2004,37 but the Court de-
nied certiorari in mid-January, 2005.38 
TREATMENT OF ADOPTION BY HOMOSEXUALS IN    
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
No European nation categorically denies homosexuals the 
opportunity to adopt children. Instead, the current discussion 
throughout Europe is not whether homosexuals can adopt, but 
rather whether gay and lesbian couples should be able to adopt 
jointly. Like Florida, many European nations also employ the 
“best interest of the child” standard in adoption determinations. 
The outcomes, however, of a “best interest of the child” analysis 
in Europe often yield a very different result in same sex adop-
tion cases. 
THE NETHERLANDS 
In 2001, The Netherlands legalized same-sex marriage, ex-
tending to same-sex couples identical rights, benefits, and bur-
dens associated with marriage.  This also included the right to 
adopt children.39  Joint adoptions by homosexuals are permitted 
under the 2000 amendments to the Dutch Act on Adoption by 
Persons of the Same Sex, so long as the requesting individuals 
“have been living together during at least three continuous years 
immediately before the submission of the request.  The request 
can be an adopter who is the . . . registered partner or other life 
partner of the parent . . .”40  As in Florida, section 1:227(3) of 
the Act explicitly requires that the adoption be in the child’s best 
interest.41  Even so, one in every thirteen Dutch same-sex cou-
ples has adopted children.42 
DENMARK 
Denmark currently allows joint adoption by same-sex cou-
ples.43  Before 1999, however, homosexual couples were not 
allowed to adopt children together, regardless of whether it was 
the partner’s child or an unrelated child.44  The legislature’s ra-
tionale for denying joint adoption was based on a belief that the 
child’s best interest required having both a “father” and a 
“mother”45 and a fear that least developed countries may be de-
terred from sending adoptable children to Denmark if same-sex 
couples may potentially be the adoptive parents.46 
In 1999, however, Denmark lifted its categorical ban on 
same-sex couple adoption, realizing a “new understanding of the 
phrase the child’s best interest” (emphasis added).47  The Danish 
legislature noted that the children affected by the ban had 
“inferior legal status compared to that of children in marriage 
regarding inheritance rights and in cases in which the partner-
ship dissolved.”48 Moreover, the children had not been safe-
guarded against the possibility that the parental figure who had 
not been legally allowed to adopt could avoid certain legal obli-
gations connected with the child if the partnership ended or the 
parent died.49 
Because foreign born children represent the large majority 
of adoptable children throughout Europe50 and homosexuality is 
considered immoral or illegal in their countries of birth,51 it is no 
surprise that Denmark still prohibits gays and lesbians from 
jointly adopting unrelated children from abroad.52  Same-sex 
couples are limited to adoption of their partner’s biological chil-
dren.53 
SPAIN 
Spanish law is among the most liberal because both gay and 
straight couples can marry and adopt children.54  Until very re-
cently, each of the country’s autonomous communities (regional 
groupings of provinces) used its wide executive and legislative 
autonomy55 to legislate varying types of adoption law.56  On 
June 30, 2005 Spanish Parliament approved57 a bill which ex-
tends the Spanish constitutional right to marry to couples of the 
same sex, thereby insuring them all the rights previously af-
forded only heterosexuals.58  The bill cites an increasing social 
 acceptance of homosexuality alongside the Constitutional guar-
antees of nondiscrimination and free personality development in 
support of the modifications.59  Among other changes, it 
amended the second paragraph of Article 44 of the Spanish Civil 
Code to read, “marriage is to have the same requirements and 
effects whether both contracting parties be of the same or differ-
ent sex,”60 including the right to adoption.61 
FLORIDA’S TRASH-WORTHY LAW 
Florida’s current law is ill-advised for several reasons, all of 
which could be remedied by the passage of a bill similar to those 
proposed in the Florida senate during the 2005 session.62  Flor-
ida’s current statutory law stands alone as the only United 
States’ jurisdiction to categorically deny gays and lesbians the 
opportunity to adopt, and Florida’s law looks regressive and 
discriminatory by other Western nations’ standards.  This arti-
cle’s survey of the current status of same-sex adoption law in 
other countries demonstrates that a large number of Western 
nations have moved well beyond the question of whether gays 
and lesbians should be able to adopt.  The contemporary West-
ern world’s question is whether homosexual couples should be 
able to adopt jointly.  Moreover, the rationales employed by 
Florida in the Lofton case are pre-textual, at best.63 It is not in 
the best interest of any Floridian child for homosexuals to be 
categorically prohibited from adopting. 
ORIGINS OF ADOPTED CHILDREN 
While “international adoptions comprised approximately 
21% of unrelated adoptions in the United States, they comprised 
a staggering 96% of unrelated adoptions in Sweden. Statistics 
from the Netherlands show an almost identical contrast.  Simi-
larly, in Denmark, only 7% of the total adopted children were 
born in Denmark.”64  Moreover, European nations fear that al-
lowing gay and lesbian couples to adopt jointly will discourage 
least developed countries from sending foreign born children to 
Europe, thus severely diminishing the number of adoptions an-
nually.65 This fear is hardly irrational, as the China Center for 
Adoption Affairs (CCAA) “recently advised that ‘adoption ap-
plications from homosexual families are not acceptable.’”66  
Florida, however, does not suffer a native-born-children short-
age like Europe does.  In 2001 “there were over 3,400 children 
in Florida eligible for adoption for whom there were no adoptive 
parents available.”67  By putting a categorical ban on adoption 
by homosexuals, Florida automatically decreases the number of 
its children who will be adopted each year. 
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 
It may in fact be in the best interest of Floridian children if 
homosexuals were not categorically excluded from adopting 
them. By changing the standard to a case by case analysis, the 
legislation currently pending before Florida’s Senate wisely rec-
ognizes that the best interest of the child should be paramount to 
prejudice against homosexuals.68  As noted above, Florida is 
home to 3,40069 of the approximately 117,000 U.S. children 
legally free and adoptable.70  Rather than statutorily excluding 
homosexuals from the potential pool of available parents,71 Flor-
ida should be taking steps to remove the barriers that keep wait-
ing children from adoption. This is especially true because no 
conclusive evidence establishes that homosexuals are less com-
petent parents.72  “Children raised by parents with a same-sex 
orientation are thriving.”73  In fact, the alternative of allowing 
children to remain not adopted may have negative developmen-
tal impact on children.74  The propriety of removing said barriers 
becomes especially important in light of the fact that childrear-
ing by homosexuals is widespread throughout Florida75 and is 
on the rise nationwide.76  In 1976, an estimated 300,000 and 
500,000 gay and lesbian biological parents had children.77  By 
1990, there were between six million to fourteen million chil-
dren with a gay or lesbian parent, and between eight million to 
ten million children being raised in a gay or lesbian household.78 
According to the 2000 census, every county in Florida reported 
at least one same-sex couple with children under age eighteen in 
the household,79 and over 40% of Florida counties have a higher 
proportion of same-sex couples with children than the national 
average.80 
Whether or not these numbers can be extrapolated to other 
geographical locations is unimportant.  What is significant is 
that the European response to modern homosexual parenting 
trends, though not perfect, seems more concerned with deter-
mining the actual best interests of the child than the Florida ap-
proach by allowing homosexuals to adopt children either alone 
or jointly.81  For example, one motivation Denmark had in ex-
tending joint adoption rights to homosexuals was precisely to 
avoid situations in which children raised by gays and lesbians 
would be disadvantaged by an inferior legal status because of 
the parent’s sexual orientation.82 
DISCRIMINATION 
Florida’s law is not supported by the state’s purported ra-
tionales, and it is discriminatory in such a way that would be 
impermissible under foreign and international law.  The legisla-
tive history of Florida’s ban on homosexual adoption would be 
fatal for the bill if it were being proposed before the legislative 
body of one of the countries discussed above.  Judge Barkett 
details the legislative history of § 63.042 in his Lofton dissent, 
calling the statute’s enactment a “witch-hunting hysteria more 
appropriate to the 17th century than the 20th,” during which 
Anita Bryant, one of the law’s biggest advocates, referred to 
homosexuals as “human garbage,” among other things.83 
DOMESTIC TRENDS 
Despite the burgeoning number of European countries that 
allow same-sex couples to adopt jointly, as well as the growing 
judicial and legislative mandate internationally that gays and 
lesbians should at least be allowed to adopt individually, it is 
unlikely that an increased number of jurisdictions in the United 
States84 will feel compelled to extend similar adoption opportu-
nities anytime soon.  In 2004, eleven American states amended 
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 their state constitutions to exclude same sex couples from ever 
realizing marriage.85  Those states include Kentucky, Oklahoma, 
Michigan, Mississippi, Oregon, Ohio, Georgia, Utah, Arkansas, 
Montana, and North Dakota.86  In addition, since the federal 
Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) became federal law in 
1996,87 over thirty-seven states have enacted state versions of 
the DOMA,88 which preclude recognition of same sex marriages 
performed by another state.89  If anything, these anti-gay mar-
riage provisions create a climate of animus against homosexuals, 
which fosters rather than discourages legislation akin to Flor-
ida’s statutory ban on homosexual adoption. 
Given the fact that the United States Supreme Court has 
denied certiorari in the Lofton case,90 and the Florida Supreme 
Court has upheld equal protection, due process, and privacy 
challenges to the adoption statute,91 few legal alternatives are 
left to homosexual Floridians seeking to adopt children.  There 
is the possibility of amending the Florida Constitution in such a 
way as to effectively repeal the anti-gay adoption law or an 
amendment as a citizen’s initiative process.92  Given that Flo-
ridians have used their initiative process to protect health and 
welfare before,93 it is not beyond the realm of possibility to think 
that Florida citizens may one day amend their constitution to 
protect the best interests of adoptable children by removing bar-
riers to gay adoption. 
CONCLUSION 
Florida’s statute is inconsistent with the developed world’s 
treatment of homosexual adoption.  This article exposes the fact 
that Florida lags behind other U.S. states, as well as many for-
eign jurisdictions insomuch as it remains the only state with a 
statute categorically banning homosexuals from adopting.  
Given the persuasive case made by the past legislative proposals 
in the Florida senate and foreign jurisdictions, the Florida legis-
lature should reconsider shutting down future bills attempting to 
revise the categorical ban on gay adoption.  Instead, it should 
revise or eliminate the statutory ban on homosexual adoption, 
using the European perspective on the best interest of the child.  
Though trends in other Western nations proved of little influ-
ence on the final disposition for the Lofton plaintiffs, the Loftons 
will hardly be the last gay Floridians seeking to adopt.  Florida 
would be well advised to pay attention to the best interest of the 
child analysis utilized by other countries so that more eligible 
Floridian children can be adopted.  Instead of allowing the ho-
mophobic rhetoric of “human garbage” to permeate Florida law, 
lawmakers should strongly consider allowing gays and lesbians 
access to adoption. 
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 OPEN WINDOW: 
MATTER OF LOVO’S IMPLICATIONS FOR 
TRANSSEXUAL AND IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES 
 
By Grisella Martinez, Esq.* 
A  valid marriage was defined under federal law in the passage of the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) in 1996,1 as one between a man and a woman.  Many le-
gal advocates recognized this legislation as a door slamming shut 
the possibility of legal recognition of same-sex marriages.  How-
ever, the DOMA failed to define the terms “man” and “woman.” 
Presumably this omission occurred because federal legislators 
and America’s heterosexual dominant culture did not contem-
plate scenarios involving men and women who had undergone 
sexual reassignment.  Congress’ failure to define these terms 
opened a window where marriage between a man and a post-
operative transsexual woman,2 or vice-versa, could be classified 
as a valid marriage under federal law,  thereby providing a basis 
for conferring immigration and other federal benefits.  The 
Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) affirmed this basis for 
immigration benefits in Matter of Lovo, which firmly established 
immigration benefits could be conferred on a spouse in a mar-
riage where the other spouse was a postoperative transsexual.  
MATTER OF LOVO: AN OVERVIEW 
The BIA3 held in Lovo4 that the DOMA “does not preclude, 
for purposes of federal law, recognition of a marriage involving a 
postoperative transsexual, where the marriage is considered by 
the State in which it was performed as one between two indi-
viduals of the opposite sex.”  In addition, the BIA held that “a 
marriage between a postoperative transsexual and a person of the 
opposite sex may be the basis for [spousal immigration] bene-
fits…where the State in which the marriage occurred recognizes 
the change in sex of the postoperative transsexual and considers 
the marriage a valid heterosexual marriage.”  The Immigration 
and Nationality Act (“INA”) states that U.S. citizens may file 
beneficiary petitions for “alien relatives” who are “immediate 
family members.”  Immediate family members, who qualify as 
“beneficiaries” of a petition, include spouses, as well as parents, 
and children.  The INA does not define who constitutes a 
“spouse” for purposes of immigration law.  
The petitioner in Lovo was a postoperative transsexual U.S. 
citizen woman who married a male citizen of El Salvador. The 
couple wed in North Carolina, and the petitioner subsequently 
filed a visa petition for her husband so that he could apply for 
lawful permanent resident status and acquire his “green card.”  
The petitioner provided the United States Citizenship and Immi-
gration Service (“the Service”) with: 1) her North Carolina birth 
certificate showing her sex as “female;” 2) an affidavit from her 
physician attesting to her sexual reassignment surgery; 3) a 
North Carolina court order demonstrating her change of name;  
4) her North Carolina marriage certificate; and 5) her North 
Carolina driver’s license showing her name and her current sex 
as a female.   
During its investigation, the Service discovered that the Peti-
tioner was born a male in North Carolina, and had undergone 
sexual reassignment surgery to become a female.  The Service 
erroneously denied her visa petition stating that a valid marriage 
for purposes of immigration law was a federal question; there-
fore, her marriage was invalid because it was not between one 
man and one woman.  The Service found that the beneficiary 
was ineligible for immigration benefits as a spouse. The peti-
tioner filed a Notice of Appeal to the BIA. 
On appeal, the BIA stated that its analysis involved 
“determining first whether the marriage is valid under [s]tate law 
and then whether the marriage qualifies under the [Immigration 
and Nationality] Act.”5  The BIA concluded that under the statu-
tory laws of North Carolina,6 a valid marriage is one between a 
male and a female (although these terms were undefined in the 
statute) and that the law expressly prohibited same-sex mar-
riages.  The BIA also discussed provisions of North Carolina’s 
statutes that set forth requirements for amending birth certifi-
cates.7  These statutes explicitly permit the changing of an indi-
vidual’s sex on the birth record after sexual reassignment surgery 
and when proof of such surgery is provided from a licensed phy-
sician.  Based on these facts, the BIA determined that the peti-
tioner and beneficiary had entered into a valid marriage under 
the laws of the State of North Carolina.  
The BIA next addressed the second issue of whether the 
marriage qualified as a valid marriage under current immigration 
law.  It noted the absence of any language in the INA defining 
“spouse” and the failure of the DOMA to elaborate on the defini-
tion of “spouse” other than to state that “the word ‘spouse’ refers 
only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”8  
The BIA also closely examined the failure of the DOMA and 
federal law to address the specific issue of postoperative trans-
sexuals entering into marriage.  In addressing this failure, the 
BIA looked to several sources of statutory construction and inter-
pretation including the text of the DOMA, its legislative history, 
and relevant case law.  
Citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc.,9 the BIA followed the well-settled canon of statu-
tory construction that “if the language of the statute is clear and 
unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete, as we clearly ‘must 
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.’”  
It found that the legislative history and plain text of the DOMA 
clearly applied to marriages between a man and a woman and not 
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 to same-sex couples.  It also found that the House Committee 
Conference Report used the terms “same sex” and “homosexual” 
interchangeably and repeatedly addressed the repercussions of 
allowing homosexual couples to marry.  The BIA highlighted the 
fact that Congress never addressed the issue of marriage by post-
operative transsexuals in any legislative proceedings and found 
this failure to be remarkable in light of various state statutes rec-
ognizing transsexual marriage.10  The BIA held that:   
[T]he legislative history of the DOMA indicates that 
in enacting that statute, Congress only intended to 
restrict marriages between persons of the same sex. 
There is no indication that the DOMA was meant to 
apply to a marriage involving a postoperative trans-
sexual where the marriage is considered by the State 
in which it was performed as one between two indi-
viduals of the opposite sex.11   
Of even greater interest is the 
BIA’s conclusion that Congress did not 
intend to overrule long-standing case 
law that provides for state dominion in 
determining the validity of marriage.  
The BIA held that the recognition of 
such a marriage deemed valid under 
state law did not require Congressional 
authorization for the purposes of immigration.12 
However, the Service argued against this interpretation and 
asked the BIA to give the terms “man” and “woman,” as used in 
the DOMA, their “common meaning” when evaluating the valid-
ity of a marriage.  Arguing that chromosomal patterns conclu-
sively established “sex” because of their immutability, the Ser-
vice contended that females with XX chromosomes and males 
with XY chromosomes could never change their sex, even if they 
underwent sexual reassignment surgery.  The BIA rejected this 
argument, citing the great debate within the medical community 
concerning determinations of an individual’s sex.13  
Additionally, the BIA also recognized that not all individu-
als are born with strictly XX or XY chromosomes and that “[a] 
chromosomal pattern [was] not always the most accurate deter-
mination of an individual’s gender.”14  Furthermore, the BIA 
declared an individual’s original birth certificate did not provide 
an accurate method for determining gender.  The “incongruities” 
and “ambiguities” in medical criteria for determining a person’s 
sex using purely physical markers at birth supported this find-
ing.15  The BIA ended its analysis by reaffirming its position 
that, “for immigration purposes,” it is appropriate to use a cur-
rent birth certificate “to determine an individual’s gender.”16 
RECOGNITION OF THE ABILITY TO CONFER IMMIGRATION 
BENEFITS ON A TRANSSEXUAL SPOUSE AS A TWO-FOLD 
PRECEDENT 
Lovo raises many issues, not only for the transsexual immi-
grant community, but the greater transsexual community at large.  
The primary importance of the BIA’s holding is that the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice are 
bound by this precedent in adjudicating visa petitions and depor-
tation and removal proceedings involving transsexual immi-
grants.  On a broader scale, this holding is significant because it 
suggests that other agencies within the federal government may 
recognize the validity of transsexual marriages in conferring fed-
eral benefits on spouses.  
IMMIGRATION BENEFITS 
The full implication of Lovo has yet to be established.  To 
date, the Service has not adjudicated Lovo’s petition on remand 
from the BIA, but in theory, the Service cannot deny the petition 
solely because the petitioner or beneficiary is a transsexual.  
However, this does not preclude the Service from denying the 
visa petition on other grounds.  The most relevant example of 
this situation is the case of Donita Ganzon (a U.S. citizen Fili-
pino male to female transsexual) and her husband Jiffy Javellana 
(a Filipino male immigrant). 
       Donita Ganzon immigrated to the 
United States in the 1970s.  In 1981, 
she underwent sexual reassignment 
surgery.  Subsequently, she legally 
changed her name and sought recogni-
tion of her sex change through the Cali-
fornia state courts.  The state of Califor-
nia issued her a California driver’s license and allowed her to 
change her nursing license to reflect her sex as female.17  When 
she became a U.S. citizen six years later, her Certificate of Citi-
zenship listed her current name and her sex as female.  In addi-
tion, the United States State Department issued her a passport 
which listed her sex as female.  
In 2000, Ms. Ganzon met Jiffy Javellana in the Philippines.  
Approximately one year later she filed a fiancé visa for him with 
legacy INS18 and he entered the United States.  They married in 
Nevada a few months later.19  During their interview with the 
Service for Mr. Javellana’s green card, Ms. Ganzon revealed that 
she was a transsexual.  Shortly thereafter, the Service denied her 
husband’s application for permanent resident status based on the 
invalidity of his marriage to Ms. Ganzon.  The couple filed suit 
in U.S. District Court for the Western Division of California20 
seeking a declaratory judgment against the Department of Home-
land Security.  While the suit was pending, Mr. Javellana filed a 
second application for adjustment of status and hoped that the 
BIA’s ruling in Lovo would preclude the Service from denying 
him a green card based on the alleged invalidity of his marriage 
to a transsexual.  In October 2005, the Service d5enied Mr. Jav-
ellana’s application “in the exercise of discretion,” stating that 
Ms. Ganzon and Mr. Javellana had failed to prove that they en-
tered into their marriage in good faith and that the marriage was 
“bona fide.”21 
This case illustrates how future effects of Lovo have yet to 
be realized in the context of visa petitions and adjustment appli-
cations.  It remains to be seen whether the Service will grant the 
petition or deny it on another “discretionary” ground.  Regard-
less of the outcome, Lovo endures as precedent in immigration 
law and potentially allows transsexual spouses to claim immigra-
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 tion benefits in other contexts aside from family-based visa peti-
tions.  Under Lovo, the opportunities for transsexual spouses to 
claim immigration benefits extend to employment-based visa 
petitions, non-immigrant visa petitions, asylum applications, and 
deportation and removal proceedings.  
For example, aliens sponsored for an immigrant visa by a 
United States employer may also file for derivative permanent 
resident status for their spouses and children.  Again, as with 
family-based immigrant visas, there is no definition of “spouse” 
and the couple need only prove that they entered into a valid and 
bona fide marriage.  Lovo also potentially applies to visa peti-
tions for non-immigrants.  This includes applicants for student 
visas, employment visas, diplomatic visas, and other special 
non-immigrant visa categories.  As long as a benefit is given to 
the visa holder’s spouse it could appropriately be considered 
under the BIA’s ruling.  Likewise, an alien filing for asylum, if 
granted, may also pass on benefits to qualifying “derivatives.”22  
In the case of a spouse, the only requirement for the spouse to 
receive benefits based on asylum (such as permanent resident 
status) is that the asylee married their spouse prior to receiving a 
grant of asylum.  
In deportation and removal proceedings,23 an immigrant 
may request various forms of relief from removal based on mar-
riage to a U.S. citizen or legal permanent resident.  For example, 
when an “out-of-status”24 alien has continuously remained in the 
United States for over ten years, the alien may request cancella-
tion of removal based on “extreme hardship” to the U.S. citizen 
or legal permanent resident spouse.  Again, the statutes and 
regulations25 discussing cancellation of removal do not define 
“spouse” nor do they impose any other prerequisites on the mar-
riage, other than it be bona fide. Therefore, it is possible, under 
Lovo, that a transsexual spouse could claim or confer the benefit 
of marriage as a basis for relief from removal.  
To better illustrate this point, imagine the following: a U.S. 
citizen male to female transsexual legally marries a male immi-
grant who is out-of-status. He has resided in the United States 
continuously for over ten years prior to the commencement of 
his removal proceedings.  They have two adopted minor U.S. 
citizen children, but have no other immediate or extended family 
members in the United States.  The U.S. citizen wife does not 
work and the husband is the sole source of financial income for 
the entire family.  They own real property together and various 
other assets.  Under this set of facts, the Immigration Court is 
bound by the determination of the BIA in Lovo to allow the hus-
band to apply for cancellation of removal based on extreme 
hardship to his U.S. citizen spouse and children.  Although the 
grant of the application is still a discretionary decision made by 
the immigration judge, the husband could not be precluded from 
applying for cancellation of removal before the Court based on 
an “invalid” transsexual marriage.  In addition, if the judge de-
nies the application, the husband could appeal to the BIA, which 
would have the power to remand the case to the Immigration 
Court for a decision consistent with its holding in Lovo. 
Therefore, the extent to which the BIA’s holding in Lovo 
affects transsexual spouses has yet to manifest before the Ser-
vice or the Immigration Court.  The uncertainties involved in the 
ability of transsexual spouses to confer benefits as U.S. citizens 
or to receive them as immigrants has great potential for litiga-
tion in federal courts and before administrative agency adjudica-
tory bodies. 
FEDERAL BENEFITS 
If the DOMA does not preclude a transsexual spouse from 
conferring an immigration benefit on their legal spouse, then it 
follows that it would not preclude any transsexual spouse from 
conferring any federal benefit on their legal spouse.  This con-
clusion stems from the implication, drawn from Lovo, that a 
valid marriage under state law where a spouse is transsexual 
may serve as the basis for receiving or conferring federal bene-
fits on the other spouse, regardless of the DOMA.  
The arena of federal health benefits is a prime example of 
the potential benefits for married couples.  The federal govern-
ment currently employs more than two million people.26  The 
Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”), the self-proclaimed 
“human resources agency” of the government is responsible for 
administering the Federal Employees Health Benefit Program 
(“FEHB”) and several other benefits programs.27 
Under the FEHB Program, federal employees and their fam-
ily members are eligible for health coverage.  The enacting stat-
ute for the FEHB states that a “‘member of family’ means the 
spouse of an employee” as well as certain categories of chil-
dren.28  The statute does not provide a definition of the term 
“spouse.”  The accompanying regulation offers no further clari-
fication other than to state that the term “member of family” has 
the meaning set forth in the statute given above.29  Aside from 
the applicable statute and regulations, the only other source of 
guidance is the FEHB Handbook which reiterates that “[f]amily 
members eligible for coverage under your self and family enroll-
ment are your spouse (including a valid common law marriage 
[in accordance with applicable state law]) and children.”30 
There are no publicized cases where a federal employee 
attempted to confer health benefits on a transsexual spouse or 
where a transsexual federal employee attempted to confer bene-
fits on a spouse.  There is no reliable data on how many trans-
sexuals are residing in the United States,31 but probability dic-
tates that someone will inevitably raise a claim based on the 
ability to confer federal benefits to a spouse, in which one of the 
parties is a transsexual.  The OPM does have an adjudicatory 
board (the Merit System Protection Board) for handling various 
administrative issues, but they do not review health benefit is-
sues.32  Under the FEHB’s enacting statute “[t]he district courts 
of the United States have original jurisdiction, concurrent with 
the United States Court of Federal Claims, of a civil action or 
claim against the United States[.]”33 Therefore, the federal em-
ployee would have the right to file an action against the govern-
ment in federal court immediately. 
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 CONCLUSION 
Lovo opens the door to analyzing multiple types of potential 
“federal benefits” conferred on transsexual spouses, including, 
but not limited to, Social Security, tax and veterans benefits.  
However, the factual dynamics of Lovo are very narrow and 
may raise other issues that potentially complicate the rights of 
those who do not fall into the same category.  This is because 
Lovo did not contemplate the numerous other possible permuta-
tions of transsexual marriage.  The BIA did not identify the pos-
sible outcomes if both spouses had been transsexuals.  It also did 
not take into account for the marriage of a transsexual woman to 
a biological man.34  Nor did it consider the applicability of its 
ruling to transsexuals trying to confer benefits but whom were 
unable to legally change their sex, were married in states that 
did not legally recognize changes of sex, or were already mar-
ried prior to having sexual reassignment surgery.  Therefore, 
while the BIA clearly recognized that there were potentially 
“anomalous results” in refusing to recognize legal changes of 
sex, the BIA did not fully address the consequences of its hold-
ing on a broader scale.35 
In the final analysis, Lovo is an important and precedential 
case not only in the immigration context, but also as a step for-
ward for the transsexual community as a whole.  Although the 
DOMA closed an important door for the lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
and transgendered community, the BIA’s holding in Lovo seems 
to have opened a window in the fight for transsexual rights.  It 
will take time and litigation in both the administrative and judi-
cial arenas to determine exactly how far these rights extend. 
ENDNOTES 
* Grisella M. Martinez received her J.D., with certification from The Compara-
tive and International Law Institute, from the Columbus School of Law at Catho-
lic University of America.  She is currently an LL.M. student in Law and Gov-
ernment at American University Washington College of Law, focusing in Ad-
ministrative Law and Regulatory Practice.  She is a practicing immigration law 
attorney. 
 
1 Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996). 
2 See Sarah Leinicke, Post Operative Transsexuals Right to Marriage, 1 MOD-
ERN AM. 18 (Spring 2005), available at http://wcl.american.edu/
modernamerican/01/1sleinicke.pdf (providing a more comprehensive discussion 
of transsexual marriages). 
3 The BIA is an administrative appellate body in the Executive Office of Immi-
gration Review, U.S. Department of Justice. It is responsible for adjudication of 
appeals of family-based visa petitions (among other areas) filed with the U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services, Department of Homeland Security. Deci-
sions by the BIA in these matters are considered final agency determinations. 
4 In re Lovo, 23 I&N Dec. 746 (BIA 2005). 
5 Id. at 748 (citing Adams v. Howerton, 673 F. 2d 1036, 1038 (9th Cir. 1982)). 
6 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-1.2 (2004). 
7 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-118(b)(4) (2004). 
8 Lovo, 23 I&N at 749.   
9 467 U.S. 8376, 843 (1984). 
10 Lovo, 23 I&N at 750 (stating that at the time of its review 22 States and the 
District of Columbia had passed laws recognizing transsexual marriages). 
11 Id. at 751. 
12 Id. at 752. 
13 Id. at 752 (listing eight criteria generally used within the medical community 
to determine sex to prove the complexity of the argument as: 1) genetic or chro-
mosomal sex, 2) gonadal sex, 3) internal morphologic sex, 4) external morphol-
ogic sex, 5) hormonal sex, 6) phenotypic sex, 7) assigned sex and gender of 
rearing, and 8) sexual identity). 
14 Id.  
15 Id. at 753. 
16 Id. 
17 Vrinda Normand, Gender Bender, METRO, Mar. 23, 2005, available at http://
www.metroactive.com/papers/metro/03.23.05/empaqu-0512.html. 
18 The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was moved from the juris-
diction of the Department of Justice to the newly created Department of Home-
land Security and is now called the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. 
Agency proceedings prior to this change are often referred to as those under the 
“legacy INS.”  
19 See Normand, supra note 17. 
20 Jiffy Javellana et al. v. John Ashcroft et al, No. 2:04-cv-09672-DT-RC. 
21 Yong B. Chavez, Transgender Spouse is Denied Green Card Again, PACIFIC 
NEWS, Oct. 20, 2005, available at http://news.pacificnews.org/news/
view_article.html?article_id=62a7b0ce817d740a7d9fb0f496fe93fc. 
22 Derivatives include children and spouses. 
23 Deportation and Removal proceedings are adjudicated by the Immigration 
Court, Executive Office of Immigration Review, under the Department of Jus-
tice. Deportation proceedings are distinguished from removal proceedings as 
proceedings which commenced prior to September 30, 1996, subsequent to the 
amendments of the Illegal Immigrantion Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
Act (IIRIRA). All actions commencing after this time are removal proceedings. 
24 “Out of status” refers to an alien who is no longer in legal immigrant or non-
immigrant status. 
25 See NACARA 203 Relief, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, http://
uscis.gov/graphics/services/residency/nacara_howapply_ins.htm. 
26 See STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT OF HUMAN CAPITAL SECOND QUARTER FY 
2005 UPDATE, http://apps.opm.gov/humancapital/stories/2005/Quarter2.cfm. 
27 Such as the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program (FEGLI), the 
Federal Long Term Care Insurance Program (FLTCIP) and the Federal Employ-
ees Retirement Benefits (FERS) program 
28 See Government Organization and Employees 5 U.S.C. § 8901(5) 
“Definitions.” 
29 See Federal Employees Health Benefits Program 5 C.F.R. 890.101(a). 
30 See FEHB Handbook, U.S. Office of Personnel, www.opm.gov/insure/
handbook/fehb01.htm, at 153.  
31  Varied estimates place the number from 30,000-40,000 while others postulate 
that the number may be as high as 3 million.  
32See Maddox v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 759 F.2d 9, 10 (1985) (stating 
that The Merit System Protection Board’s jurisdiction is not plenary; it is limited 
to those matters over which it has been given jurisdiction by law, rule, or regula-
tion); see also Trotter v. Office of Personnel Management, 50 M.S.P.R. 267, 269 
n.2 (1991) (stating that the Board lacks jurisdiction to review OPM determina-
tions concerning the denial of health insurance benefits). 
33 See Government Organization and Employees 5 U.S.C. § 8912.   
34 See Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 233 (Tex. App. 1999) (refusing to recognize 
the marriage of a transsexual woman to a biological man because they were 
chromosomally the same sex, which requires recognizing the marriage of same-
sex couples where one partner is a transsexual).  
35 Lovo 23 I&N at 753, n. 5 (noting the potentially anomalous results of this 
refusal and providing examples of ambiguity). 
Spring 2006 31 
 UNDER GRACE:1 LEGAL ISOLATION AND THE  
CHILDREN OF THE OLD ORDER AMISH 
 
By Jennifer Lavoie* 
L argely defined by their isolation, the Amish have carved out pockets in which self-policing communities shun intrusion and view modernity as contrary to their 
dogma.  Born into these insular communities, most children of 
the Old Order Amish will know only a Plain2 life.  This life en-
tails simplicity in worship, dress, lifestyle, and work.  Amish 
parents’ religious beliefs dictate what experiences or practices 
are acceptable and few Amish children stray from such restric-
tions.3  Because of their idiosyncratic isolation, the Amish have 
been granted exceptions from certain laws,4 and the seclusion 
inherent to Amish life impedes the enforcement of others.  These 
factors converge to create unique legal issues for Amish chil-
dren. 
For the Amish, religion is not sim-
ply professed, but lived; every action is 
devotional.  Sins, even otherwise le-
gally punishable acts, are confessed to 
God before the entire community.  
Once forgiveness has been sought, the 
issue is deemed resolved.5  To confront 
someone with a matter that they be-
lieve is only between God and the sin-
ner is itself, a separate sin.  Transgres-
sions against God or the community are punished through 
meidung, or public shunning.6  Although this, too, varies in se-
verity depending on the group—some treat it as a mere formal-
ity, while others enforce the ban as absolute—the temporary ex-
communication can mean up to six weeks of no social contact 
whatsoever.7  Shunning is meant to be redemptive; those who 
have broken their baptismal vows are isolated until they have 
atoned for their sin.8 
Thus, Amish children do not avail themselves of the protec-
tions of the State.  Not only are they often unaware of laws in-
tended to protect them, but if they become aware, they rarely 
report violations.9  Child labor laws, for example, are not a con-
sideration in Amish communities.  According to Amish tradition, 
children are trained and supervised until competent.10  Working 
on a rural farm can be dangerous, and even though care is taken, 
the Amish do not prohibit children from participation in hazard-
ous employment.  Children injured do not report violations be-
cause they are taught that the community resolves issues, and 
they are loath to become an informant against their families.  In 
1998, responding to fines for labor violations, the Amish sought 
a Congressional exemption from child labor laws.11  A bill was  
subsequently signed into law in 2004.12 
State intrusion into Amish affairs is infrequent.  Officials are 
alerted to problems only rarely and experience considerable re-
sistance during investigations.13  Moreover, the public perception 
of the Amish is that of an idiosyncratic but peaceful and law-
abiding people, which afford the Amish certain legal exemp-
tions.  Some exemptions, such as their exemption from Social 
Security, affect Amish children only tangentially.  Others di-
rectly affect Amish children, such as the Supreme Court decision 
in Yoder, which permitted Amish parents to withhold education 
from their children.14   
In 1968, several Amish parents were convicted for failing to 
send their children to school.  Although Wisconsin requires edu-
cation to the age of sixteen, their tradition was to educate chil-
dren only to the eighth grade.  More education, they argued, 
caused arrogance, as it elevated an individual’s intellectual inter-
ests over their community involvement and constituted a deter-
rent to salvation.15  Another reason cited when Amish parents 
sought exemption for their children 
from mandatory attendance require-
ments was that exposure to modern 
culture in high school would introduce 
an unacceptable value system at a criti-
cal stage of development.16  As one 
Lancaster woman argued, “The more 
they know, the more apt they are to 
leave.”17 
      The Supreme Court determined that 
compulsory attendance requirements unduly burdened the par-
ents’ free exercise of religion.18  Since everything the Amish do 
or refrain from doing is dictated by their religious beliefs, activi-
ties that would otherwise be secular became religious obser-
vances.  Justice Burger also noted that few, if any, other sects or 
religions could successfully make such an argument.19  The deci-
sion in Yoder represents only the fifth time the Supreme Court 
granted a free exercise exception beyond those protected by the 
speech clause.20 
The Supreme Court previously held that a religious convic-
tion does not nullify the state’s authority within a family unit and 
explicitly permitted legal restriction of a parent’s rights in areas 
such as child labor or mandatory school attendance,21 yet the 
Yoder decision stands.  Thus the state’s compelling interest in the 
education of Amish children is subsumed by their parents’ con-
stitutionally-protected religious beliefs.  Yoder is so fact-specific 
to the Amish that it would be of little precedential value for other 
religious groups,22 but opens the door for further exceptions, if 
the Amish choose to claim them. 
Even so, the Amish are hardly a litigious group poised to 
exploit their unique circumstances.  In the decades since Yoder, 
there has not been a rush of policy-changing suits.  Yet no group, 
however quaint, is immune from problems.  When such prob-
lems arise, it is perhaps inevitable that a self-policing group that 
perceives “the force of law as contrary to the Christian spirit”23 
will present significant and troubling deviations from the law.  
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 The most striking example of a harmful deviation from the 
legal protection within Amish sects is the communities’ response 
to sexual assault.  Although it may contradict the popular idea of 
Amish lives as ones of idyllic simplicity, there are problems of 
statutory rape, child molestation, and incest within these insular 
communities.  Local shelters and counseling centers have had to 
tailor education programs to target victims who rarely, if ever, 
enter schools or hospitals where such assaults might be recog-
nized.24   
The problems common to prosecuting sexual battery charges 
are exacerbated in the Amish community.  Reports of rape are 
discouraged in Amish communities.25  When charges are filed, 
entire villages refuse to cooperate with investigations,26 and wit-
nesses are ordered not to testify.27  One investigating officer la-
mented, "The moment we approach them as police, they shut up, 
the whole clan."28  Victims find little support or opportunity for 
recovery and are punished for making their experiences public.29   
Circumstances are even more dire for those who report sex-
ual abuse while still minors.  When Anna Slabaugh, 13, reported 
her brothers were raping her, adults in her community threatened 
and beat her.  Even when, as punishment for coming forward, 
Anna’s mother and an Amish man removed all her teeth, Anna 
was never taken into protective custody.30  Browbeaten into re-
scinding the accusations, she eventually ran away from her com-
munity.31   
Similarly, Mary Byler, who until recently was a member of 
an Amish community in Wisconsin, was raped by her older cous-
ins and brothers from the time she was six until she turned sev-
enteen.32  When she sought help from her mother and clergy, she 
was rebuffed with instructions to fight 
and pray harder.  Her neighbors blamed 
Mary for her brothers’ actions and she 
was forbidden to discuss the subject.  
She was told, “He says he’s sorry and 
you have to forgive him.”33  When 
Mary finally filed a police report, her 
brothers were arrested.  One eventually 
was sentenced to eight years in prison; 
the other received ten years of probation, with one year of nights 
spent in county jail.34   
At Mary’s rapists’ sentencing, a large contingent of friends 
and family showed up to support the young men35 who had al-
ready served their Amish punishment of shunning.36  Mary, for 
her part, may no longer contact her family or childhood friends; 
her church voted unanimously to excommunicate her.37  Soon 
after Mary filed her report two more women from her church 
came forward to report their own cases of assault.38 
In another case, Norman Byler molested several of his 
daughters and granddaughters over the course of three decades.  
He was eventually prosecuted and sentenced to five years in 
prison, but despite the terms of his release, was returned to the 
same family members he molested.39   
Victims must choose between aiding in the cover-up of their 
own assault or banishment and losing contact with everyone they 
know.40  Even if their attacker is convicted and imprisoned, 
many victims must accept their rapist back into the congregation 
upon release.41  With their community united in silencing them, 
and the state unwilling to interfere in the sphere of “The Gentle 
People,”42 young victims of sexual abuse truly have nowhere to 
turn. 
It would be unfair to characterize the entirety of Amish soci-
ety by the actions of a few.  Many Amish single out childrearing 
as the single most important aspect of their life and entire com-
munities participate in preparing children for adulthood.43  Even 
those who leave the church acknowledge that Amish life is ful-
filling for most born into it.44   
The decision to abandon their heritage is a harrowing one, 
yet some Amish do so for the sake of their children.  Genetic 
disorders, in particular, are common among the Amish—a result 
of centuries of intermarriage.45  When their children are ill and 
treatment is available and conflicts with the ordnung, some par-
ents must choose between their children and their religion.  Iva 
Byler left her community, her husband, and her two healthy adult 
children so that she might obtain treatment for her three youngest 
daughters who were stricken with a rare crippling disease with 
no known name or cure.46   
Ananius and Delia Stutzman chose to remain in their reli-
gious community when their daughter, Mary, was diagnosed 
with leukemia.  The Stutzmans believed the illness was God’s 
will.  They would have preferred to keep her at home with their 
six other children, administer homeopathic remedies, and try to 
keep her comfortable until death—which doctors estimated to be 
only weeks or months away, if she remained untreated.  Instead, 
a Michigan judge ordered that Mary 
receive a spinal tap and chemotherapy.  
With treatment, doctors testified, she 
stood a 65% chance of surviving to 
middle age.47 
      The Stutzmans objected to modern 
medical treatment for Mary on the 
grounds that it was excessively intru-
sive, destroyed healthy cells along with 
the bad, and presumed to contravene God’s will.48  Not all 
Amish reject Western medicine, although their use of it remains 
selective.49  The complexity of treatment, or use of electricity, is 
not at issue.  Rather, they emphasize that although medicines 
may help the ill, only God can heal.50  Amish parents do seek 
preventative medicine for their children, though not to the extent 
that mainstream Americans utilize medical care.51 
In People v. Pierson,52 the Court of Appeals of New York 
found a man who believed disease should be cured only by di-
vine intervention criminally liable for the death of his daughter.  
The Supreme Court held that the right to practice religion freely 
does not include the liberty to expose the community or a child 
to disease, ill health, or death;53 parents must safeguard both so-
ciety and their children.  Nevertheless, Amish children are less 
likely to be vaccinated than their counterparts.54   
Although no religious tenets specifically forbid vaccines, 
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 most Amish parents choose not to immunize their children.55  In 
1979, America’s last significant polio outbreak swept through 
Amish communities in Iowa, Wisconsin, Missouri, and Pennsyl-
vania.56  At that time, the Amish were almost entirely un-
vaccinated.  Many sought immunizations, yet five more cases of 
polio were detected in a Minnesota community in 2005.57  Public 
health officials traveled door-to-door, seeking permission to test 
for the disease and entreating people to vaccinate.  Nevertheless, 
fewer than twenty children were vaccinated of a two hundred-
person village.58   
Although the faith itself is not founded upon the absence of 
conveniences, the culture created by the Amish is so bound to 
religious observances that Amish belief and Amish life are indis-
tinguishable.  Thus, under the free exercise clause, both receive 
protection.  Consequently, the Amish exist not only outside the 
modern world, but outside its laws, as well.  
Perhaps any inherent inequality in the enforcement of laws 
is preferable to the alternative.  Any attempt to remedy dispari-
ties may spawn new, equally troubling problems.  Certainly the 
importance of free exercise should be clear.  Applying religious 
freedom to all but the Amish would be an even more problematic 
exception than what currently exists.  
While some Amish would argue that intrusion through more 
regulation or enforcement could end the Amish way of life, 
surely some issues are remediable, without mortally wounding 
Amish existence.  Mere tradition need not subrogate the well-
being of Amish children.  Strict enforcement of child labor laws 
could be economically disastrous for the Amish, but engaging 
children in hazardous activities is not fundamental to a Plain life.  
Blaming the victim and concealing sexual battery is neither de-
sirable nor a central feature of a religious community.  
34 THE MODERN AMERICAN 
ENDNOTES 
* Jennifer Lavoie is a first-year law student at Washington and Lee University 
School of Law.  She received her M.S.M. from the University of Florida in 2005 
and her B.A. and B.S. from the University of Florida in 2004. 
 
1 In Romans 6:14, Paul argues that the saved need not concern themselves with 
the laws of man, for the only edict that should govern them is the will of God. 
“Sin shall have no dominion over you, for ye are not under the law, but under 
grace.”  
2 FREDRIC KLEES, THE PENNSYLVANIA DUTCH 11 (The Macmillan Company 
1950). 
3 Thomas J. Meyers, The Old Order Amish: To Remain in the Faith or to Leave, 
68 MENNONITE QUARTERLY REVIEW No. 3, 390 (July 1994). 
4 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that Amish children 
cannot be compelled by the State to attend high school past age 16 due to the 
constitutional provisions in the first and fourteenth amendments).   
5  Nadya Labi, The Gentle People, LEGAL AFFAIRS (Jan. 2005), http://
legalaffairs.org/issues/January-February-2005/feature_labi_janfeb05.msp; see 
also, Ed Hoskin, A Question of Justice in Amish Communiy, LACROSSE TRIB. 
Mar. 28, 2004, http://www.lacrossetribune.com/articles/2004/03/28/
news/00lead.txt; Barbara Pinto, Sex Abuse Case Shocks Amish Community (ABC 
News television broadcast Oct 22, 2004), 
available at http://openweb.tvnews.vanderbilt.edu/2004-10/2004-10-22-ABC-
10.html.  
6 KLEES, supra note 2, at 31.  
7 DONALD KRAYBILL, THE RIDDLE OF AMISH CULTURE 133 (John Hopkins 
Press 2001). 
8 Id. at 137. 
9 Brad Igou, 2002 Amish Series: People of Peace, Victims of Violence, AMISH 
COUNTRY NEWS (2002), http://www.amishnews.com/amisharticles/
peopleofpeace.htm.  
10 Brad Igou, The Traditional Family and the Amish, AMISH COUNTRY NEWS Pt. 
1 (2001), http://www.amishnews.com/amisharticles/traditionalfamily.htm.  
11 Steven Greenhouse, Foes of Idle Hands, Amish Fight Child Labor Rule, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 18, 2003, at A9.  
12 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199 (allows Amish 
teenagers to work in apprenticeships once they have completed their formal 
education).  
13 Labi, supra note 5. 
14 Yoder, 406 U.S.at 207. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Labi, supra note 5.  
18 Id.  
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
22 William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free 
Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE W. RES. 357, 367 (1990). 
23 Labi, supra note 5. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Labi, supra note 5. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Labi, supra note 5. 
34 Barbara Pinto, Sex Abuse Case Shocks Amish Community (ABC News televi-
sion broadcast Oct 22, 2004). 
35 Id. 
36 Labi, supra note 5. 
37 Id. 
38 Id.; see also, David E. Yoder, Equal Protection Clause in Jeopardy in the 
State of New York, Amish Abuse (Aug. 22, 2004), http://www.amishabuse.com/
byler.htm.  
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Yoder v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Corr., 03-C-193-C, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4915, 
at *12 (W.D. Wis. Mar 11, 2004). 
41 JOHN HOSTETLER, AMISH SOCIETY, 83 at 343 (John Hopkins Press 1963) 
(1993). 
42 Igou, supra note 9.  
43 RUTH IRENE GARRETT & RICK FARRANT, CROSSING OVER: ONE WOMAN’S 
ESCAPE FROM AMISH LIFE   (Harper Collins 2003).  
44 HOSTETLER, supra note 41, at 328-31. 
45 Genetic Disorders Hit Amish Hard (CBS News television broadcast June 8, 
2005), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/06/08/60II/main700519.shtml. 
46 Shantell M. Kirkendoll & Ken Palmer, Chemo Begins for Amish Girl, FLINT 
JOURNAL (Apr. 22, 1999), http://www.rickross.com/reference/general/
general46.html. 
47 Id. 
48 HOSTETLER, supra note 41, at 322-28. 
49 Richard Pletcher, Amish Children in the Hospital  Amish Acres (Nov. 18, 
1998),  http://www.amishacres.com/aa_farmstead/miscellaneous/
amish_children_hospital.htm. 
50 HOSTETLER, supra note 41, at 326-28. 
51 People v. Pierson, 68 N.E. 243, 244 (N.Y.1903). 
52 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944). 
53 Alicia M. Fry, Haemophilus influenzae Type b Disease Among Amish Chil-
dren in Pennsylvania: Reasons for Persistent Disease, 108 PEDIATRICS 4 (2001). 
54 Gardiner Harris, Five Cases of Polio In Amish Group Raise New Fears, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 8, 2005 available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/08/
national/08polio.html?ex= 
1289106000&en=3dd9b31a55c475b0&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss. 
55 David Brown, Polio Outbreak Occurs Among Amish Families In Minnesota, 
WASH POST, Oct. 14, 2005, at A03. 
56 Harris, supra note 54. 
57 Brown, supra note 55. 
 Spring 2006 35 
LEGISLATIVE UPDATES 
H. R. 288 Civil Rights Amendments Act of 2005  
Introduced by Representative Towns (D-NY) 
This bill will amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the 
Fair Housing Act to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex-
ual orientation and will be known as the “Civil Rights Amend-
ments Act of 2005.”  The amendment contains the same text of 
the original Acts protecting people from being discriminated 
against, but substitutes the words “religion” and “color” with 
“affectional or sexual orientation.” 
 
H. R. 40 Commission to Study Reparation Proposals for  
African-Americans Act 
Introduced by Representatives Conyers (D-MI), Brown (D-
FL), Clay (D-MO), Davis (D-IL), Jackson-Lee (D-TX), Lee 
(D-CA), Meek (D-FL), Nadler (D-NY), Olver (D-MA), Payne 
(D-NJ), Rush (D-IL), Thompson (D-MS), Waters (D-CA), 
Watt (D-NC), Jackson (D-IL), McDermott (D-WA), Meeks 
(D-NY), Millender-McDonald (D-CA), Norton (D-DC-AL), 
Owens (D-NY), Rangel (D-NY), Schakowsky (D-IL), Towns 
(D-NY), and Watson (D-CA). 
This bill acknowledges the abhorrent nature of the slavery 
as it existed in the United States and aims to establish a commis-
sion to evaluate the subsequent discrimination against African-
Americans and to make recommendations to the Congress on 
possible reforms.  The purpose of this Act is to “examine the 
lingering negative effects of the institution of slavery” and de-
cide if any formal apology is needed or any form of compensa-
tion to the descendants of the African slaves is fitting. 
 
H. R. 286 Medicaid Obesity Treatment Act of 2005 
Introduced by Representative Towns (D-NY) 
This bill intends to require the states that provide Medicaid 
prescription coverage to cover drugs medically necessary to treat 
obesity.  Deaths related to obesity are the second leading cause 
of death in the U.S. and the prevalence of obesity in children is 
nearly twice what it was in the 1980s.  This is particularly trou-
blesome as childhood obesity continues into adulthood and in-
creases the risk of other serious diseases.  Gender, age, race, 
ethnicity, and income create variances in risk factors for many of 
these diseases.  For instance, there are overweight people in all 
segments of the population, but obesity is more common in His-
panic, African American, Native American, and Pacific Islander 
women.  Overweight people often are victims of discrimination 
and thus, psychological stress and reduced income. 
 
S. 2160 Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders Higher  
Education Enhancement Act 
Introduced by Senator Boxer (D-CA) 
This bill aims to amend the Higher Education Act of 1965 
to include Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders.  The Asian 
American and Pacific Islanders are an extremely diverse popula-
tion due to the existence of varying ethnicities, immigration pat-
terns, historical experiences, and social group issues.  Census 
figures record that there are seventeen ethnic groups considered 
as Asian and four considered as Pacific Islander.  Despite ac-
knowledging these differences, educational programs and poli-
cies are based on aggregated data that assumes Asian Americans 
and Pacific Islanders are a homogenous group, neglecting the 
differences in level of education attained by subgroups within 
the larger group.  The diverse cultural, linguistic, socioeco-
nomic, and historical experiences affect educational levels. 
In addition, the predominating “model minority myth” 
negatively affects many youth who are incorrectly perceived as 
being academically superior and thus, not needing educational 
support services.  Only 12.6% of the total Asian Americans and 
Pacific Islander population lives in poverty which masks the 
disparity contained within the group.  For instance, 25% of Viet-
namese Americans, 63.6% of Hmong Americans, 42.6% of 
Cambodian Americans, 34.7% of Laotian Americans, and 17.7% 
of Pacific Islanders live in poverty.  These statistics are inextri-
cably linked with educational attainment as only 13.8% of Viet-
namese Americans, 5.8% of Laotian Americans, 6.1% of Cam-
bodian Americans, less than 5.1% of Hmong Americans, and 
only 13.8% of Pacific Islanders had college degrees.   
 
H. RES. 367 Condemning bigotry, violence, and discrimina-
tion against Iranian-Americans.  
Introduced by Representatives Meehan (D-MA), Shays (R-
CT), Mica (R-FL), and Feeney (R-FL). 
This resolution urges all levels of law enforcement officials 
to aggressively prosecute crimes committed against Iranian 
Americans as a result of their national origin or ethnicity.  Ira-
nian Americans have been subjected to an increased number of 
arrests followed by extended arbitrary detentions without 
charges, denials of access to counsel, and abuse by prison guards 
in the aftermath of September 11, 2001.  Additionally, since 
September 11, there has been a massive surge in the number of 
discriminatory crimes directed towards Americans of Middle 
Eastern descent, including Iranian Americans.   
By Eriade Hunter* 
* Eriade Hunter is a first-year law student at American University Washington Col-
lege of Law and staff writer for The Modern American.  
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